A Reasoning-Process Review Model for Federal Habeas Corpus by Semeraro, Steven
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 94
Issue 4 Summer Article 2
Summer 2004
A Reasoning-Process Review Model for Federal
Habeas Corpus
Steven Semeraro
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
Justice Commons
This Criminal Law is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Steven Semeraro, A Reasoning-Process Review Model for Federal Habeas Corpus, 94 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 897 (2003-2004)
0091-4169/0419404-0897
THE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW & CRIMINOLOGY Vol. 94, No. 4
Copyright 'C 2004 by Northwestern University, School of Law Pintcd i U.S.A.
A REASONING-PROCESS REVIEW MODEL
FOR FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
STEVEN SEMERARO*
For more than a century, judges and commentators have debzted the
standard of review applied in federal habeas corpus cases, i.e. collateral
attacks on state criminal convictions in federal court.' Prior to 1996, the
federal statute creating habeas jurisdiction did not specify a degree of
scrutiny, and the standard applied by the courts varied over time in vaguely
articulated ways untethered to the statutory language. 2 In 1996, Congress
enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, which, for the
first time, explicitly included a standard of review.3  It permits a federal
habeas court to grant the writ only if a state court decision was "contrary
to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States."4
. Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Associate Professor of Law, Thomas
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their comments and encouragement, Eric Mitnick for his help in understanding the scope of
judicial review of agency decisions, and the faculty at the Thomas Jefferson School of Law
for permitting me to present an early version of this article at the school's scholarly paper
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product. The author also thanks Elizabeth Corasiniti, Dorothy Hampton, and June MacLeod
for their excellent research assistance.
This system of federal court collateral review of state criminal convictions is referred to
in this article as federal habeas review. Habeas proceedings are nominally independent civil
actions that test the lawfulness of an inmate's confinement. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1994). As a
practical matter, however, a federal habeas court reviews the state court's decisions on
matters of federal constitutional law in the same way that an appellate court reviews a trial
court's decisions. The concept of a standard of review in federal habeas can thus be
understood as the degree of deference that a federal habeas court should afford to the
decisions of the state courts.
2 See infra Part I.A.
' 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (Supp. IV 1999).
4 Id. This article discusses the standard of review applicable on federal habeas to
questions of law and mixed questions of fact and law. With respect to pure questions of fact,
the 1996 Act also permitted a federal habeas court to grant the writ when the state court
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The Supreme Court has interpreted that standard to require a state
court to reach what it calls an "objectively reasonable" decision.
Conceptually, a federal habeas court may be required to deny the writ even
if, had it been reviewing the case de novo, it would have ruled for the
petitioner. As long as objectively reasonable jurists could debate the issue,
the Court has said, a federal habeas court must allow the state's decision to
stand.5
6Many have argued that this new standard of review is too narrow.
Others have advocated even narrower habeas review.7 Pointing to different
historical periods, both sides of this debate contend that the writ must
remain true to its original form. A critical examination of habeas's history,
however, reveals that it has no true form. Instead, it has evolved as the role
of federal constitutional law in state criminal justice systems has changed.8
To justify a particular level of federal habeas review in the contemporary
criminal justice system, one must do more than point to some period in
which the preferred level of review existed. One must demonstrate
instrumentally how particular levels of scrutiny of federal constitutional
claims on federal habeas would serve particular goals in modem society.
Neither the instrumental arguments that have been made for broad de novo
review nor those for extremely narrow habeas review coherently support or
explain the value of habeas in contemporary criminal justice systems. This
article therefore concludes that the debate is unwinnable and should be
abandoned in favor of a new model of federal habeas review.
Unfortunately, the current federal habeas standard is not an acceptable
solution. The concept of objective-reasonableness, despite its name, is not
objective at all. It turns on the court's subjective assessment of a concept
that could not be vaguer: whether a decision reached by a state court, even
if wrong to the mind of the federal judge, is nonetheless reasonable not
simply in the sense that respected judges have reached it but in some
unreasonably determined "the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court
proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).
5 See infra Part I.B.
6 For examples of articles written before the adoption of the 1996 Act arguing in favor of
de novo habeas review, see generally James S. Liebman, Apocalypse Next Time?: The
Anachronistic Attack on Habeas Corpus/Direct Review Parity, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1997
(1992); Ann Woolhandler, Demodeling Habeas, 45 STAN. L. REV. 575 (1993); Larry W.
Yackle, Explaining Habeas Corpus, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 991 (1985).
7 For the classic argument, see generally Paul Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and
Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441 (1963).
8 See generally Steven Semeraro, New Perspectives on Habeas Corpus History
(forthcoming, under submission fall 2004) (copy on file with the author) (arguing that the
writ has served to enable superior court systems to enforce their right to articulate the law, an
instrumental function that is served by different levels of review over time).
[Vol. 94
REASONING-PROCESS REVIEWMODEL
additional objective sense. Such a standard provides no basis other than the
subjective assessment of the federal habeas court to gauge the
reasonableness of a state court's decision.
This incoherence is problematic in the obvious sense that it does not
guide the lower federal courts and thus renders the law more unpredictable
than it needs to be. Rejecting all attempts to adopt objective standards 9 or
familiar review formulations,' 0 the Court simply reiterates, as if repetition
could produce clarity, that objectively reasonable results must be upheld.
Even worse than this uncertainty, the objective-reasonableness
standard undermines both the principle of reasonable deference to state
decisions embodied in the 1996 Act and Article VI's constitutional mandate
that state courts are bound by federal law." The 1996 Act required federal
habeas courts to defer to reasonable applications of federal law, which
given Article VI should be interpreted to mean well-reasoned opinions
taking full account of the applicable law.' 2 The Supreme Court's objective-
reasonableness standard makes the quality of state court analysis irrelevant.
Deference thus turns not on the reasonableness of the state's analysis, as
Congress intended, but on the federal court's subjective assessment of the
merits of the state court's result. By failing to demand even cursory state
court analysis of federal law, yet permitting reversal no matter how
thorough the state's analysis, the Court's objective-reasonableness standard
is inconsistent with the 1996 Act and permits, and may even encourage,
state courts to avoid their constitutional duty under Article VI.
9 See infra text accompanying note 34.
1o See infra text accompanying note 38.
" U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (asserting that federal law "shall be the supreme Law of the
Land; and Judges in every State shall be bound thereby"). The Supreme Court has long
recognized that Article VI demands that state judges fully enforce federal law even at the
expense of conflicting state law. As the first Justice Harlan described the obligation:
Upon the State courts, equally with the courts of the Union, rests the obligation to guard, enforce,
and protect every right granted or secured by the Constitution of the United States and the laws
made in pursuance thereof, whenever those rigbts are involved in any suit or proceeding before
them; for the judges of the State courts are required to take an oath to support that Constitution,
and they are bound by it, and the laws of the United States made in pursuance thereof, and all
treaties made under their authority, as the supreme law of the land, "anything in the Constitution
or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding." If they fail therein, and withhold or deny
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, the
party aggrieved may bring the case from the highest court of the State in which the question
could be decided to this court for final and conclusive determination.
Robb v. Connolly, I I l U.S. 624, 637 (1884); see also Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103,
113(1935).
2 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(l)-(2) (Supp. 2004).
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This article proposes an alternative to the objective reasonableness
standard that would look to the state court's reasoning process rather than
the merits of its result. Under this standard, a federal habeas court would
look first to whether the state court cited the federal law that the habeas
court would have cited had it been presented with the claim. Second, the
federal court would ask whether the state court weighed the factors that
federal law would have required the habeas court to evaluate. If a state
court considered the cases and weighed the appropriate factors, the federal
court would deny the petition and allow the state decision to stand without
addressing the merits of the claim. 3 Where the state court did not fully
analyze applicable federal law, however, a federal habeas court applying
reasoning-process review would return the case to state court for more
thorough analysis, but again without addressing the merits.' 4 If a state court
repeatedly refused to apply the applicable federal law, the Supreme Court
would remain free to address the merits on certiorari review.
Part I of this article briefly traces the historic standards of review
applied in federal habeas cases and explains the standard now applied by
the Court. Part II challenges the theologies favoring either narrow or broad
collateral review of state criminal convictions in federal court, concluding
that the arguments for and against are roughly equally persuasive and
equally speculative. Part III critiques the objective reasonableness standard
of review, concluding that its flaw is incoherence and its unjustifiable cost
is the undermining of the state courts' constitutional obligation to treat
federal law as supreme. Part IV describes reasoning-process review. It
argues that this standard, which is analogous to forms of review used in
other areas of the law, would provide appropriate deference to well-
reasoned state court decisions, as the 1996 Act requires, without freeing
states of their Article VI obligations, as the Supreme Court's objective-
reasonableness standard effectively does.
13 This article focuses on the "unreasonable application" prong of the 1996 Act's
standard of review. It does not directly address the question whether a state court decision is
"contrary to" federal law. As a practical matter, however, it is unlikely that a decision
contrary to federal law could meet the elements of the reasoning-process review proposed in
this article. See infra Part IV. Such a decision would not likely cite the applicable federal
law or address the relevant considerations that federal law requires a court to weigh in
reaching a decision.
14 Returning cases to state court rather than ordering the conditional release of the
prisoner should be a permissible remedy under the federal habeas statute, which permits
courts to "dispose of the matter as law and justice require." 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1994).
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I. STANDARDS OF REVIEW IN FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS CASES
Although federal habeas review has always rested on statutory law,
prior to 1996 Congress never articulated a standard of review. As a result,
the Supreme Court has taken it upon itself to define habeas's scope. 5
Unfortunately, the Court's pronouncements are invariably vague and debate
has raged both within and outside the Court with respect to the level of
scrutiny that has actually been applied.
16
Congress's decision, for the first time, to squarely address the scope of
federal habeas in the 1996 Act has led the Court to pay greater attention to
the issue than it had before. Nevertheless, the standard that the Court
applies, and whether that standard best accords with the statutory language,
remains unsettled.
A. HISTORIC STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Section 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 created authority in the federal
courts to grant the writ to prisoners held in federal custody "for the purpose
of an inquiry into the cause of commitment."'17 Two early amendments
expanded the scope of the writ to cover state prisoners who were (a)
confined for fulfilling their obligations to the federal government, or (b)
serving a foreign government.' 8 The 1789 formulation arguably suggested
15 Jordan Steiker, Innocence and Federal Habeas, 41 UCLA L. REV. 303, 310-11 (1993).
16 Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277 (1992) (Justice Thomas's lead opinion and Justice
O'Connor's concurrence debate the standard of review); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72,
78-85 (1977) (describing the Court's changing approach to the standard of review over
time); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (Justice Powell's opinion for the Court and
Justice Brennan's dissent debate the scope of habeas review). Compare Bator, supra note 7,
at 463-64 (arguing that the pre-1952 Court reviewed state decisions only for lack of
jurisdiction or unconstitutional statutes or sentences), with Gary Peller, In Defense of
Federal Habeas Corpus Reitigation, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 579, 620 (1982)
(concluding that 1867 Act indicated that Congress believed state courts would not "vindicate
federal law" and it thus conferred full authority to federal courts to adjudicate federal claims
anew).
' Ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, (1789).
18 In 1833, Congress extended the scope of federal habeas to cases in which a prisoner
was held by a state tribunal as a result of conduct undertaken in the service of the federal
government. Ch. 57, § 7, 4 Stat. 634-35 (1833) (extending power of federal courts to grant
the writ in favor of a prisoner "committed or confined on, or by any authority or law, for any
act done, or omitted to be done, in pursuance of a law of the United States, or any order,
process, or decree, of any judge or court thereof..."). In 1842, the power was further
extended to prisoners who were "subjects or citizens of a foreign State" held under federal or
state law for acts protected by the law of a foreign state and principles of international law.
Ch. 257, 5 Stat. 539 (1842) (extending power of federal courts to grant the writ in favor of a
prisoner held "on account of any act done or omitted under any alleged right, title, authority,
privilege, protection, or exception, set up or claimed under the commission, or order, or
2004]
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that the writ would be available only to those confined without cause, since
it provided for inquiry only into the "cause of commitment." The early
amendments, however, made at least some causes improper. Unfortunately,
the early Court never articulated the standard that it applied, and
commentators have reached no firm conclusions about the federal courts'
early practice.' 9
In 1867, Congress adopted the habeas language that remains in force
today: "[T]he several courts of the United States ... shall have power to
grant writs of habeas corpus in all cases where any person may be
restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the constitution, or of any
treaty or law of the United States .... ,,2 Despite the apparent clarity and
broad scope of this language, debate as to Congress's intent has lingered.
Some commentators have narrowly interpreted the 1867 Act merely to
extend the existing habeas power to freed slaves who were effectively
bound to continued servitude by state law.21 Others have argued that the
sanction, of any foreign State or Sovereignty, the validity and effect whereof depend upon
the law of nations, or under color thereof").
19 Although most commentators and the Court itself have interpreted the 1789 statute to
prohibit federal habeas review of state cases, Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 409 (1963); Bator,
supra note 7, at 465, at least two commentators reach the opposite conclusion. ERIc M.
FREEDMAN, HABEAS CORPUS: RETHINKING THE GREAT WRIT OF LIBERTY 46 (2001); see
generally Francis Paschal, The Constitution and Habeas Corpus, 1970 DUKE L.J. 605
(1970).
20 An Act to amend "An Act to establish the judicial Courts of the United States," ch. 28,
14 Stat. 385 (1867).
21 WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 242 (1980)
("[T]here was no hint that the measure was intended to apply to those convicted by a state
court of competent jurisdiction .... ); Clarke D. Forsythe, The Historical Origins of Broad
Federal Habeas Review Reconsidered, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1079, 1116 (1995):
[T]here is a strong and consistent record that can be read to understand the 1867 Act as referring
to the Thirteenth Amendment and the Reconstruction laws designed to enforce it. Indeed, the
purpose of protecting the freedmen seems to dominate the entire course of the bill .... [A]side
from the class of persons protected, there is nothing in the legislative history that alters the
conclusion from the text that the Act did not change the English limitations except in the mode
of factual inquiry.
Id.; Lewis Mayers, The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867: The Supreme Court as Legal Historian,
33 U. Cin. L. REV. 31, 55-56 (1965) ("[Tlhere is no foundation for the Court's assertions that
the 1867 act was intended to afford a new remedy for state prisoners, that it was enacted in
contemplation of anticipated southern resistance to Reconstruction, and that it was aimed at
implementing the fourteenth amendment."); Neil McFeeley, Habeas Corpus and Due
Process: From Warren to Burger, 28 BAYLOR L. REV. 533, 535 (1976) ("Historical research
indicates that the. . . [1 867 Act was] instituted to protect the newly-freed slaves against the
vagrant and apprentice laws formulated by the southern states.").
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Act created a federal forum to review all questions of federal law that arise
in state criminal cases.
22
The Court itself fueled this continuing debate by repeatedly failing to
squarely address the standard of review applicable to habeas cases. Prior to
its 1952 decision in Brown v. Allen, the Court often insisted that federal
habeas courts did not review constitutional questions de novo.23 Yet, some
cases suggested otherwise.24 After Brown, the Court assumed for nearly
forty years that de novo review was appropriate. 5 In the early 1990s,
however, the Court called that assumption into question nearly rejecting the
notion that it had ever endorsed de novo review.26 Although failing to take
that extreme step, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Court effectively
eliminated de novo review by (1) entirely prohibiting federal habeas courts
22 Ex Parte McCardle, 73 U.S. 318, 325 (1868) ("This legislation is of the most
comprehensive character. It brings within the habeas corpus jurisdiction of every court and
of every judge every possible case of deprivation of liberty contrary to the National
Constitution, treaties, or laws. It is impossible to widen this jurisdiction."); Peller, supra
note 16, at 620 (concluding that 1867 Act indicated that Congress believed state courts
would not "vindicate federal law" and it thus conferred full authority to federal courts to
adjudicate federal claims anew).
23 See, e.g., McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131, 138 (1934); Ash v. United States ex rel.
Valotta, 270 U.S. 424, 426 (1926); Knewel v. Egan, 268 U.S. 442, 446 (1925); Henry v.
Henkel, 235 U.S. 219, 228-29 (1914).
24 Compare In re Wood, 140 U.S. 278, 285-87 (1891) (refusing to review as applied
equal protection claim in federal habeas proceeding), with Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S.
356, 374 (1886) (granting as applied equal protection claim on habeas review); see also
Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923) (reversing on ground that mob influence over the
jury constituted a violation of the Due Process Clause).
25 During the period, the Court either cited Brown v. Allen for its authority to review
federal constitutional claims on habeas review, see, e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 414
(1963), or simply reviewed the claim de novo without citing any authority at all. See, e.g.,
Whiteley v. Warden, Wyo. State Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560 (1971). In 1966, Congress next
significantly amended the habeas statute. Without changing the basic definition of the writ's
scope, Congress limited the federal habeas courts' discretion to hold evidentiary hearings
where state fact findings were made. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(a)-(c) (1966); see S. Rep. No. 89-
1797, at 2 (1966); see also H.R. Rep. No. 89-1892, at 5-6 (1966), reprinted in 1966
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3663-64. Like the amendments before it, this one did little to clarify the level
of scrutiny that federal courts should apply to state court interpretations of the Federal
Constitution.
26 In Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277 (1992), the lead opinion by Justice Thomas argued
that the Court had never actually held that de novo review of federal habeas claims was
appropriate. Id. at 287 (per Thomas, J., announcing the judgment of the Court) ("We had no
occasion [in Brown] to explore in detail the question whether a 'satisfactory' conclusion was
one that the habeas court considered correct, as opposed to merely reasonable."). A
majority of the Court, however, held that de novo review was required. Id. at 300-03
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating holding of Court that the federal habeas statute required
federal habeas courts to review state court decisions on legal issues and most mixed
questions of fact and law de novo).
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from reviewing claims that raised constitutional questions that were not
clearly established;27 and (2) adopting an actual prejudice harmless error
standard in place of the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard
applied generally to constitutional questions in criminal cases.2"
B. THE CURRENT HABEAS STANDARD OF REVIEW
In 1996, Congress for the first time explicitly imposed a standard of
review on federal habeas courts, requiring that they uphold a state court
decision so long as it was not "contrary to, or [did not] involve[] an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined
by the Supreme Court of the United States., 29 Even under this relatively
clear language the justices disagreed on the appropriate standard, ° and the
writ continues to be applied, to say the least, flexibly.
3
'
27 In Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), the Court established the principle that new
rules of constitutional criminal procedure may not be established on habeas corpus. Like the
Court's standard of review for habeas cases, the Teague retroactivity doctrine was never
applied consistently. See, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 315 (1989) (holding claim
that jury's inability to give effect to mitigating evidence did not impose a new obligation
even though Court had never addressed the issue before, because petitioner "simply asks the
State to fulfill the assurance upon which Jurek was based; namely, that the special issues
would be interpreted broadly enough to permit the sentencer to consider all of the relevant
mitigating evidence that a defendant might present in imposing a sentence").
28 In 1971, the Court applied the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard, see
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 21-24 (1967), in a habeas case. Whiteley, 401 U.S. at
569-70, 570 n.13. Twenty-two years later, however, the Court treated the question as open
and decided that federal habeas relief could not be awarded unless the constitutional error
"had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." Brecht
v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993) (citing Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750,
776 (1946)). The Court explained that "[u]nder this standard, habeas petitioners may obtain
plenary review of their constitutional claims, but they are not entitled to habeas relief based
on trial error unless ... it resulted in 'actual prejudice."' Id.; see also O'Neal v. McAninch,
513 U.S. 432, 438-40 (1995) (re-affirming Brecht harmless-error standard but clarifying that
uouoL snuuiu oe resuivea in ravor o me naoeas petitioner).
29 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2) (Supp. 2004).
30 In Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000), the Court split 5-4 on what this language
meant. The majority held the new amendment limited the federal courts' authority to grant
the writ to cases in which state courts "unreasonabl[y] appl[y]" federal law in an objective
sense to be determined by the federal courts. Id. at 412. The four justices in the minority
concluded that the 1996 Amendment required federal courts to "give state courts' opinions a
respectful reading, and to listen carefully to their conclusions, but when the state court
addresses a legal question, it is the law 'as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States' that prevails." Id. at 387 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (citing Lindh v.
Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 869 (7th Cir. 1996)).
31 Compare Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003) (granting the writ); Penry v.
Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 791 (2001) (same); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 424 (2000)
(same); with Yarborough v. Alvarado, 124 S. Ct. 2140 (2004) (denying the writ); Middleton
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The Court has interpreted the statutory language to require a federal
habeas court to ask whether the state court has reached a decision that either
(1) "applies a legal rule that contradicts . . . [the Supreme Court's] prior
holdings or . . . reaches a different result from one of [the Court's] cases
despite confronting indistinguishable facts"32 or (2) "correctly identifies the
governing legal rule but applies it unreasonably to the facts of a particular
prisoner's case. 33 Under this approach, a habeas court must look directly
to the merits of the decision rather than the state court's reasoning.34 That
the state court may have failed to cite applicable precedent or even knew of
its existence is not critical.35  So long as the result reached does not
contradict federal law and is objectively reasonable in light of that law,36
the petition must be denied.37
v. McNeil, 124 S. Ct. 1830 (2004) (per curiam); Mitchell v. Esparza, 124 S. Ct. 7 (2003) (per
curiam) (same); Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1 (2003) (per curiam) (same); Price v.
Vincent, 538 U.S. 634 (2003) (per curiam) (same); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2002)
(same); Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3 (2002) (per curium) (same); Woodford v. Visciotti, 537
U.S. 19 (2002) (per curium) (same); Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 689 (2002) (same);
Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156, 165 (2000) (same); Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225,
227 (2000) (same). The Court has also indicated that despite the more restrictive language
of the 1996 Act, it may retain prudential restraints on federal court jurisdiction even if the
statute's requirements are satisfied. See Horn v. Banks, 536 U.S. 266, 272 (2002) (citing
Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 669-70 (2001) (O'Connor, J., concurring)) (suggesting Court
will continue to apply its retroactivity doctrine even to cases in which AEDPA standard
would permit a federal court to grant the writ, stating "none of our post-AEDPA cases have
suggested that a writ of habeas corpus should automatically issue if a prisoner satisfies the
AEDPA standard...").
32 Ranidass, 530 U.S. at 165-66.
33 Penry, 532 U.S. at 792 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 407-08 (internal quotations
omitted)).
34 See, e.g., Weeks, 528 U.S. at 236-37 (reviewing merits of claim, concluding state court
analysis was correct, and concluding "[f]or the reasons stated above, it follows afortiori that
the adjudication of the Supreme Court of Virginia affirming petitioner's conviction and
sentence neither was 'contrary to,' nor involved an 'unreasonable application of,' any of our
decisions").
31 See Early, 537 U.S. at 8 (holding that state court not required to cite applicable U.S.
Supreme Court cases or even be aware of them); Mitchell, 124 S. Ct. at 8 ("We have held
that a state court need not even be aware of our precedents .... ).
36 Although the Court maintains that it engages in two inquiries-(1) whether the state
decision is contrary to federal law in that it contradicts a Supreme Court case or (2) whether
it purports to apply the correct law but does so unreasonably-both inquiries ultimately ask
the same question: has the state court reached a decision that is reasonable given existing
precedent.
31 Mitchell, 124 S. Ct. at 12 ("A federal court may not overrule a state court for simply
holding a view different from its own, when the precedent for this Court is, at best,
ambiguous."); Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 641 (2003); Williams, 529 U.S. at 410;
Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 25 (2003); Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002).
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Defining what contradicts federal law, or what is objectively
reasonable, has proven to be a challenging and uncertain task. On the one
hand, the Court has held that a federal court should not substitute its own
judgment for that of the state court.38 A federal court is similarly prohibited
from asking whether the state court has made a clear error in the sense that
the habeas court is left with "a firm conviction that the state court was
erroneous." 39 On the other hand, a habeas court should not defer to the state
court whenever the state has provided a fair process for adjudication of
federal rights or reached a rational decision in the sense that reasonable
jurists could agree with it.40 Where between these extremes the precise
standard of review falls remains uncertain.
II. THE DEBATE OVER THE APPROPRIATE BREADTH OF FEDERAL HABEAS
CORPUS REVIEW
Virtually no commentator has supported the Court's current standard
of federal habeas review.41 Much of the existing commentary stresses the
need for a searching, de novo federal review of state criminal convictions.
The justifications range from our constitutional structure to institutional
limitations on the state courts to firmly held subjective beliefs by
experienced litigators that federal courts reach more accurate decisions on
federal constitutional questions.42
Conversely, impassioned arguments by respected legal intellects make
the opposite claim that federal habeas should be limited to ensuring that
states provide adequate procedures to address federal constitutional claims.
Justice Jackson articulated the view succinctly in an internal Court
memorandum during the Brown v. Allen deliberations: "Moderate penalties
promptly and effectively applied after fair and calm trial reviewable once to
make sure that no prejudicial error has occurred is all that a defendant ... is
entitled to. When he has had that society is entitled to have the decrees of
its courts enforced with finality.
43
38 Price, 538 U.S. at 641; Woodford, 537 U.S. at 24-25; Bell, 535 U.S. at 698-99.
39 Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76 (2002).
40 Williams, 529 U.S. at 409-10. The opinions of other courts are not, however, entirely
irrelevant to whether a decision is objectively unreasonable. Price, 538 U.S. at 641 (pointing
out that "numerous other courts have refused to find double jeopardy violations under
similar circumstances").
41 But see FREEDMAN, supra note 19, at 153 (reading the 1996 Act and the objective-
reasonableness standard as "making no fundamental alteration in the existing role of the
federal courts in inquiring into state capital convictions").
42 See infra Part II.B.
43 FREEDMAN, supra note 19, at 128.
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This Part explores the arguments on each side of this debate, asking
whether a broader or narrower standard of review on federal habeas is most
desirable. It concludes that firm answers cannot be reached, and the wiser
course would be to change the terms of the debate. Adherents to the
arguments for either broad or narrow habeas review will likely feel that this
article short-changes the arguments on their side. The goal, however, is not
to disprove definitively these arguments, but to show that the undeniable
merits of both are tempered by uncertainty that precludes the unqualified
adoption of either.
A. THE COSTS OF BROAD FEDERAL HABEAS REVIEW
A half century ago, Professor Paul Bator and Judge Henry Friendly
advanced the classic arguments for narrow habeas review. One can rightly
criticize Bator and Friendly, and many have,44 for the historical flaws in
their interpretations of federal habeas and for wrongly suggesting that their
own proposals for narrow habeas review had greater claim to historical
integrity than the doctrine they were criticizing. One cannot deny, however,
that Bator and Friendly make a strong instrumental case that "collateral
attack of criminal convictions carries a serious burden ofjustification. '45
1. Friendly's Cost/Benefit Analysis
Judge Friendly emphasized the cost of habeas review in terms of state
prosecutorial, defense bar, and judicial resources. Even more important for
him, however, were the uncertain rewards. a6 The problem is not just that
the overwhelming majority of prisoner petitions lack merit. Even among
those that are meritorious, he argues, many would simply vacate
convictions of obviously guilty defendants who would either (a) be
convicted in a new trial, or (b) receive an unjust windfall because the
passage of time had weakened the state's ability to convict.47 The subset of
cases in which granting the writ would serve a beneficial purpose, Friendly
44 See supra notes 6, 15, 18. At this point, there can be little doubt that habeas corpus
has always served a broader function in the United States than it did in the common law
English courts, and indeed was used throughout the 1800s in ways that many would now
consider outrageous usurpations of executive and legislative authority. Seymour D.
Thompson, Abuses of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 18 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1884)
(describing aggressive use of habeas by federal courts from the ratification of the
Constitution through the 1880s, the period when others have claimed that it was at its
narrowest).
45 Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments,
38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142, 146 (1970).




concluded, would be quite small. And the existence of an expansive writ
that encourages the filing of frivolous petitions might lead judges-who are
human enough to get lazy when reviewing "so much dross"-to miss the
48rare, truly meritorious petition.
2. Bator's Psychological Concerns
Bator's concerns about federal habeas were more nuanced. First, he
argued that an unlimited right to attack a criminal conviction undermines
the educative and deterrent functions of criminal punishment by
encouraging the prisoner to continually search for ways to test the
lawfulness of confinement rather than to accept punishment as a justified
response to antisocial behavior.49 Second, he contended that the existence
of de novo federal habeas review may undermine the quality of state
judicial decision-making because he saw habeas review as "subversive...
of the inner subjective conscientiousness which is so essential a part of the
difficult and subtle art of judging well." 50  Third, he stressed "a
psychological necessity in a secure and active society" of permitting a sense
of repose to form, i.e., reaching a point in which the society accepts that it
has "tried hard enough and thus may take it that justice has been done."'" If
"our limited resources" are to be channeled toward the most "productive
ends," Bator argued, "[s]omehow, somewhere we must accept the fact that
human institutions are short of infallible ....""
3. Evaluating the Criticisms of Broad Habeas Review
At the level of generality that these arguments are made, they seem
quite persuasive. And they have stood essentially unrebutted despite the
many attacks on Friendly's and Bator's histories and proposals. The further
48 Id. at 148-49 (quoting Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 537 (1953) (Jackson, J.,
.v,.u,I 111) k-IL mut prepjuuice me occasionai meritorious application to be buried in a flood
of worthless ones.")).
49 Bator, supra note 7, at 452; Anthony G. Amsterdam, Search. Seizure and Section
2255. A Comment, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 378, 387 (1964).
50 Bator, supra note 7, at 451; id. at 506 ("The crucial issue is the possible damage done
to the inner sense of responsibility, to the pride and conscientiousness, of a state judge in
doing what is, after all, under the constitutional scheme a part of his business: the decision of
federal questions properly raised in state litigation."). Although Bator is often cited as the
original skeptic with respect to broad habeas, Seymour Thompson made many similar points
nearly eighty years earlier. Thompson, supra note 44, at 3 ("The police regulations of the
States, their criminal codes, the decisions of their highest judicatories, and even their
constitutions lie at the feet of the inferior Federal judges.").
-5 Bator, supra note 7, at 452.
52 Id. at 453.
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one moves from the general to the particular, however, the more questions
these arguments raise.
With respect to the costs of habeas litigation, Friendly carefully avoids
degrading the value of enforcing constitutional rights. Instead, he
constructs a trade-off between broad habeas and effective initial criminal
prosecutions. Without denying that we must vigorously protect
constitutional rights, he suggests that the broader our habeas review, the
weaker our primary criminal processes will be." But he offers no proof
that such a tradeoff needs to be made. It seems unlikely that states fail to
prosecute, or even prosecute less effectively, because district attorneys,
courts, and defense attorneys are too busy with habeas proceedings. On the
contrary, broad habeas may save resources by helping ensure that (a) initial
prosecutions accord with the rule of law and thus (b) the resulting
convictions are less likely to be overturned on appeal.
Bator's concern with the educative and deterrent functions of criminal
law may artificially assume a unity of psychological outlook. Is it really
impossible for a convicted felon to recognize the error of his ways while
continuing to explore options to reduce the length of his sentence? And
even if the answer is yes, there are surely worse activities for those held in
state penitentiary systems than hitting the law books.
With respect to the negative impacts of broad habeas on the quality of
state court judging and the proper allocation of social resources, Bator
54readily admits that there are no bright-line answers. But there may be no
answer at all. For example, Bator posits a distinction between "smug
acceptance of injustice merely because it is disturbing to worry whether
injustice has been done" and "unreasoned anxiety that there is a possibility
that error has been made in every criminal case in the legal system.
5 5
Perhaps in Bator's era of raising expectations about the accuracy of
criminal convictions and the realistic hope that capital sentences would
soon be a relic of the past, one could see a real distinction between the
psychological states that Bator posits.5 6 Given the contemporary evidence
53 Friendly, supra note 45, at 148-49.
54 Bator, supra note 7, at 451 ("Of course this does not mean that we should not have
appeals.... [I]mportant functional and ethical purposes are served" by appropriate review.).
" Id. at 452.
56 Samuel R. Gross, The Risks of Death: Why Erroneous Convictions are Common in
Capital Cases, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 469, 470 (1996) ("Until recently, most judges, lawyers and
scholars were willing to believe that the system worked as intended: that wrongful capital
convictions were rare, and wrongful executions virtually non-existent.") (citing FRANK
CARRINGTON, NEITHER CRUEL NOR UNUSUAL 123 (1978)); Alex Kozinski & Sean Gallagher,
Death: The Ultimate Run-On Sentence, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 21 & n.99 (1995)
("[E]rrors that go to guilt or innocence are exceedingly rare in criminal cases, and even more
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of wrongful convictions even in capital cases, the picture today is
considerably murkier. 7
Friendly's and Bator's raising of these considerations is surely
valuable. As general principles unconnected to particular practices at
particular places and times, they are provocative. In themselves, however,
these instrumental arguments cannot justify any particular level of habeas
review.
B. THE BENEFITS OF BROAD FEDERAL HABEAS REVIEW
The case in favor of broad habeas is by and large more particularized
than the case against it. Ultimately, however, the arguments though
persuasive, remain inconclusive.
1. Constitutional Structure
A number of commentators have argued that the nature of the
Constitution itself compels broad federal court review of federal law issues
in state criminal proceedings. These arguments range from the original
conception of the federal courts as a place to resolve issues on which state
prejudices might influence decisions to the need for uniform law in a multi-
jurisdictional system to the value of inter-jurisdictional judicial dialogue.
Although each of these claims has merit, none logically compels broad
federal habeas review in modem American society.
a. Traditional Notions of Federal/State Relations
Our constitutional structure could be read to compel us to accept broad
federal habeas. For example, Eric Freedman and James Liebman argue that
the framers presumed that states would seek to advance parochial interests
rare in death cases."); Michael Meltsner, Capital Punishment: On Death Row, The Wait is
Over, THE NATION, Sept. 29, 1984, at 276 (explaining that public sentiment in the 1960s
weighed against continued use of the death penalty).
57 See James S. Liebman, The Overproduction of Death, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 2030,
2048-51, 2051 n.84 (2000) (citing sources identifying eighty-nine death row inmates who
have been freed since 1973 because of doubts about their guilt); Richard Rosen, Innocence
and Death, 82 N.C. L. REv. 61, 70 & n.31 (2003) ("Over the past decade over one hundred
convicted people have been released from prison based on DNA testing of physical
evidence."); id. at 78, 78 n.59 ("In approximately the last quarter century, over one hundred
people reached death row who were subsequently released on grounds of innocence.");
Barry C. Scheck, Preventing the Execution of the Innocent: Testimony Before the Senate
Judiciary Committee, 29 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1165, 1165-66 (2001) (explaining that DNA




necessitating federal oversight. 58 As Justice Storey wrote in Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee, the framers "presume[d that] ... State prejudices, State
jealousies, and State interests, might sometimes obstruct, or control, or be
supposed to obstruct or control the regular administration of justice."'5 9
Even if the original Constitution did not mandate federal habeas, the
Fourteenth Amendment may have done so, in a manner similar to the
incorporation of much of the Bill of Rights, through the due process
clause.6°
These arguments surely support federal review of some sort, but not
necessarily perpetual de novo review. Periods of open hostility between the
federal and state systems have provoked periods of de novo habeas review,
but the Court has invariably pulled back. The initial broad application of
federal habeas to the states after the Civil War and the systematic expansion
in the 1950s and 1960s were both coincident with widespread breakdowns
in the Southern judiciary's application of federal law.6' When the crises
subsided, the scope of habeas retracted. In the late 1970s, a different, but
somewhat analogous, hostility to federal death penalty law among state
court judges may have again led to an era of broad habeas review that was
again followed by a pullback.62
Some cite these periods of transition as justification for perpetual de
novo habeas review.6' Given that the Constitution did not require a system
of lower federal courts, and state courts have long played a substantial role
in deciding federal questions (including some federal criminal law matters
in the early days),64 one could argue just as persuasively that our
constitutional structure permits de novo federal habeas when necessary to
halt widespread state court hostility to federal law, but does not necessarily
58 FREEDMAN, supra note 19, at 12-19; Liebman, supra note 6, at 2097.
59 Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 349 (1816) (holding that Supreme
Court must have appellate jurisdiction over state court decisions on matters of federal law to
guard against state prejudice and ensure uniformity in federal law); see Liebman, supra note
6, at 2097.
60 Jordan Steiker, Incorporating the Suspension Clause: Is There a Constitutional Right
to Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 92 MICH. L. REV. 862, 869, 899-912 (1994).
61 Anthony G. Amsterdam, Criminal Prosecutions Affecting Federally Guaranteed Civil
Rights: Federal Removal and Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction to Abort State Court Trials, 113
U. PA. L. REV. 793-805, 818, 828 (1965); Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and
Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1133, 1153-56 (1977).
62 See Semeraro, supra note 8 (discussing history of expanding and contracting habeas
review).
63 Peller, supra note 16, at 582; see Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 511 (1953)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
64 Thompson, supra note 44, at 3.
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mandate it as standard practice during periods when state courts are
generally upholding their constitutional oaths.65
Today, isolated examples of state defiance of federal law remain, but
systematic breakdowns have not occurred for some time.66 At least one
study suggests that continued state hostility to federal constitutional rights
can no longer be presumed.67  And particularly with respect to criminal
procedure, the state courts have overwhelmingly come to adopt federal law
as their own.68  A decade ago, Joseph Hoffman and William Stuntz
concluded that "[t]he historical tension between state and federal law...
has been almost completely eliminated in the criminal procedure context., 69
"[I]n an important sense," they found, "the law of the Fourth, Fifth, and
Sixth Amendments-our detailed, national Code of Criminal Procedure-
today 'belongs' to state courts as much as it does to their federal
counterparts.... [S]tate courts deal with federal criminal procedure law the
same way federal courts do-as the sole source of detailed rules that govern
their criminal dockets." 70
Larry Yackle contends that even absent a current crisis or compulsory
constitutional text, federal habeas is justified by a "deeply held idea that
state criminal defendants are entitled to litigate their federal claims in a
federal forum other than the Supreme Court.",71  Certainly, American
society's strong affinity for liberty pushes toward that view. But our
conflicting desire for crime control commits many just as deeply to Judge
Friendly's contention that once one has an "opportunity to litigate ... [a
federal constitutional claim in a state forum], release of a guilty man is not
65 But see Steiker, supra note 60, at 899 (arguing that adoption of the fourteenth
amendment imposed a requirement of "a meaningful, nondiscretionary opportunity for
federal review of federal claims").
66 Burt Neubome, The Myth ofParity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1119 (1977).
67 Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walker, Constitutional Litigation in Federal and
State Courts: An Empirical Analysis of Judicial Parity, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 213, 224-
25 (1983); see Craig M. Bradley, Are the State Courts Enforcing the Fourth Amendment?,
77 GEO. L.J. 251 (1988).
68 Joseph L. Hoffman & William J. Stuntz, Habeas After the Revolution, 1993 SuP. CT.
REV. 65, 111 (1994) ("The notion that state courts as a whole are strongly pro-government in
criminal procedure disputes seemed plausible thirty years ago, but it is a hard sell [in 1994].
... There is no good evidence (and it is hard to see how one would go about really testing
the point), but it seems more plausible to believe that state court criminal procedure errors
are distributed about equally on both sides of the constitutional line."); Paul Bator, The State
Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 605 (1981).
69 Hoffman & Stuntz, supra note 68, at 67-68.
70 Id. at 79-81.
71 Yackle, supra note 6, at 997; id. at 1031 ("To be sure, this tradition of distrust is
traceable to historical (and modem) suspicions regarding the commitment of the state courts
to the federal procedural standards applicable to criminal cases.").
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required in the interest of justice even though he might have escaped
deserved punishment in the first instance with a brighter lawyer or a
different judge."7
b. Uniformity in Federal Law
Even if our constitutional structure does not directly compel broad
federal habeas, it might do so indirectly. Given the multiple legal
jurisdictions in our federal system, habeas review could be a means to
maintain uniformity in federal law. Unfortunately, habeas review would
not likely yield very uniform law. After all, there are more federal district
courts than state supreme courts. Moreover, if discretionary review in the
Supreme Court is sufficient to ensure uniformity in all non-criminal,
constitutional cases, the need for uniformity can hardly justify a guaranteed
federal forum in every criminal case.73
c. Fostering a Dialogue Among Federal and State Courts
Our federal structure also might support broad federal habeas as a way
to foster beneficial inter-jurisdictional dialogue among courts. At first
blush, federal habeas would seem unnecessary to achieve this goal. There
are already fifty state jurisdictions, the District of Columbia, and various
territorial courts, all handling vast criminal law dockets. Surely, they can
look to each other for inter-jurisdictional dialogue.
In 1977, however, Robert Cover observed that state criminal courts
tended to look to federal habeas courts, but not other state courts, in
developing constitutional criminal procedure doctrine. 74  Without broad
federal habeas, he feared, state courts would become more isolated and the
benefits of inter-jurisdictional dialogue lost. 75
In the quarter century since Cover made that argument, however, there
has been a dramatic expansion in federal criminal law. Federal courts now
receive ample opportunity to decide fourth, fifth and sixth amendment
questions in their own criminal cases. State courts can now look to these
72 Friendly, supra note 45, at 157.
73 Erwin Chemerinsky & Larry Kramer, Defining the Role of the Federal Courts, 1990
BYU L. REV. 67, 83-84 (1990).
74 Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus
and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035, 1046-67 (1977) (describing benefits of lower federal
court/state supreme court dialogue in developing constitutional standards such as the right to
counsel for probation and parole revocation hearings, and the appropriate measure of
counsel's effectiveness).
" id. at 1065.
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cases as the source of inter-jurisdictional dialogue, lessening the need for
federal habeas to ensure a sufficient criminal case load in the federal courts.
2. Institutional Factors
A second set of arguments used to justify broad federal habeas looks to
institutional limitations on the state courts that render them less likely than
federal courts to properly enforce the Bill of Rights. These arguments
either prove too little, or too much, to justify the de novo habeas regime that
they advocate.
a. Money, Time & Election
Federal judges are typically better paid, have more talented law clerks,
and have smaller dockets than their state counterparts.76 These factors
suggest that federal judges have advantages over state judges at the same
level of the judicial system." In considering habeas corpus, however, the
appropriate comparison is between state supreme courts and federal district
and appellate courts. The money and time differences between those courts
are certainly less pronounced.78 Still, federal courts no doubt have certain
advantages.
Many state judges are also elected. Unpopular decisions with respect
to criminal procedure rights place their status in jeopardy in a way that their
life-tenured federal counterparts need not consider.79 Of course anyone is
subject to the influence of popular sentiment, life tenure or not. The law,
however, both demands and presumes that public servants act in the public
interest in part by upholding their constitutional duties, again life tenure or
76 Neubome, supra note 66, at 1115-28.
" Id. at 1121-23.
78 Id. at 1116 n.45 ("When comparing federal district and state appellate courts... [i]f a
competence gap exists at all, it is very slight and may, indeed, favor state appellate judges.
Moreover, the sense of elan and mission characterizing federal judges is also present among
many state appellate courts.").
79 Peller, supra note 16, at 666; Neuborne, supra note 66, at 1127-28; Donald H. Ziegler,
Federal Court Reform of State Criminal Justice Systems: A Reassessment of the Younger
Doctrine from a Modern Perspective, 19 U.C. DAVis L. REv. 31, 46-48 (1985); K. LEE,
COURTS AND JUDGES 109-79 (1987). The Court has recognized "the critical importance of
life tenure, particularly when judges are required to vindicate the constitutional rights of
persons who have been found guilty of criminal offenses." Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372,
382 (1977). Yet, the Constitution does not require persons charged with federal crimes to be
tried in Article III courts, nor has it been interpreted to require habeas review by Article 1II
judges. Id. On the contrary, even judges without life tenure "must be presumed competent
to decide all issues, including constitutional issues that routinely arise in the trial of criminal
cases." Id. at 382-83 (comparing District of Columbia superior court judges to elected state
court judges and holding both capable of resolving matters of constitutional magnitude).
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not.80 Nevertheless, one cannot deny that the prospect of re-election likely
makes a difference in at least some cases.
The problem with each of these arguments is that they effectively
condemn the state judiciary to a level of under-performance that seems
intolerable in a society governed by the rule of law.8 In that sense, they
prove too much. If state judges are so resource poor and so improperly
impacted by popular sentiment, more would be required to ensure justice
than broad collateral review of federal constitutional issues in criminal
cases. Conversely, if state judges meet the baseline requirements of fair,
impartial, and intelligent judging generally, a reason beyond these
institutional factors would be needed to justify broader collateral review of
federal questions in criminal cases than is provided for other types of cases.
b. Experience and Jadedness
A court with more experience deciding a particular type of case might
be expected, all other things being equal, to do a better job of deciding that
type of case both because it would become technically more adept and
because it could become more sensitive to the need to enforce a particular
type of claim.82 Commentators have thus argued in favor of federal
jurisdiction with respect to the types of constitutional cases, such as civil
rights cases, in which the federal courts' experience is superior to the
states.
83
With respect to criminal procedure issues, however, the federal courts
are not more experienced.8 4  Despite the expanding scope of federal
go The Supreme Court has long held that state courts must be presumed to know and
follow federal law. See, e.g., Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308, 314-16 (1991); LaVallee v.
Delle Rose, 410 U.S. 690, 694-95 (1973) (per curiam).
s1 In a memorandum to Justice Jackson during the consideration of Brown v. Allen, then
law clerk William Rehnquist wrote, "[t]o think that state cts [sic] would deliberately or in
ignorance refuse to follow Supreme Court precedents is to suggest a malady in the body
politic which no additional hearing before a federal judge would cure." FREEDMAN, supra
note 19, at 121.
82 For example, Neubome argues that "if significant constitutional cases were forced into
state courts more frequently, state judges would acquire greater expertise and sensitivity in
the area and would probably develop an enhanced sense of institutional responsibility for the
enforcement of constitutional rights." Neubome, supra note 66, at 1129.
83 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE
AND FEDERAL COURTS 164-65 (1965); MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS
IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 71 (1980).
84 Cf Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493-94 n.35 ("[T]he argument that federal judges
are more expert in applying federal constitutional law is especially unpersuasive in the
context of search-and-seizure claims, since they are dealt with on a daily basis by trial level
judges in both systems.").
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criminal liability, state criminal courts continue to have vastly more
experience applying federal constitutional safeguards.
That very experience, however, might create a jadedness that
undermines the accuracy of state court decisions on federal constitutional
questions. Because state courts have as their primary responsibility the
administration of the criminal law, their concern with accurately
interpreting the guilt or innocence of the defendants may limit their ability
to dispassionately enforce federal constitutional rights. 5 As Bert Neubome
described the phenomenon: "[s]tate trial judges... are steadily confronted
by distasteful and troubling fact patterns which can sorely test abstract
constitutional doctrine and foster a jaded attitude toward constitutional
rights.8 6 Rules requiring the suppression of relevant evidence of guilt, he
believes "will command greater allegiance from a judge who has not been
repeatedly exposed to the reality of the social harms inflicted by some
felons whom the rule requires to be freed. 87
The anti-social consequences of criminal behavior are likely to affect
any judge, state or federal, who faces a difficult procedural question, and in
some sense we probably would not want entirely dispassionate judges who
could somehow remain entirely unaffected. A valid point nonetheless
remains: a judge who is not charged with presiding over the guilt or
innocence decision may find it easier to apply difficult, but important,
procedural law.
An advocate of broad habeas review, however, would need to take the
argument a step further and explain why the universal availability of state
85 Larry Yackle has explained the argument as follows:
The primary focus in state court is upon the implementation of state substantive criminal law
policies-upon the determination of guilt in the individual case. Although all participants, and
certainly state judges, also have the duty to respect defendants' federal constitutional rights, their
chief duty is to enforce the law with respect to individuals the police and prosecutors honestly
believe to have violated that law. The overriding responsibility of the state courts to carry out
state law thus deprives them of the neutrality and dispassion demanded for contemporaneous
enforcement of the fourteenth amendment. It is because they are charged with other, potentially
conflicting duties that state courts' determinations of federal claims raised in defense cannot be
accepted as final.
Yackle, supra note 6, at 1031-32; see Anthony G. Amsterdam, Criminal Prosecutions
Affecting Federally Guaranteed Civil Rights: Federal Removal and Habeas Corpus
Jurisdiction to Abort State Court Trial, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 793, 802-03 (1965); Abraham D.
Sofaer, Note, Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners: The Isolation Principle, 39
N.Y.U. L. REV. 78 (1964); Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L.
REV. 1038, 1060-61, 1113 (1970).
96 Neuborne, supra note 66, at 1125.
87 Id. Others have gone further concluding that state courts lack "neutrality," Yackle,




appellate review does not adequately fulfill the need for distanced re-
examination of procedural questions. The remoteness of at least federal
appellate courts likely makes them even more dispassionate than their state
appellate counterparts. But local courts better understand local processes
and the people that make them work.88 The scholarship to date does not
explain why one system of distanced review is superior to the other.
If one could establish that inter-jurisdictional review of constitutional
questions in criminal cases was justified, the appropriate response would
likely be an alternative system to review all criminal cases-state and
federal-rather than broad federal habeas review of state cases. That would
be true because, if state appellate review is an inadequate check on jaded
state trial courts, then federal appellate review would likely be an
inadequate check on federal district court judges when they preside over the
guilt determination. Like the more concrete institutional factors, the
jadedness argument, if one accepts it, appears to justify a remedy much
more thorough than broad federal habeas.
3. Subjective Assessment
One who reads the extensive commentary urging an expansive system
of federal habeas cannot help but conclude that the writers are relatively
unconcerned with the relative strength of the structural and institutional
arguments supporting broad review because in their hearts they know that
federal courts more effectively uphold federal criminal procedure rights
than state courts.8 9 Like all matters of the heart, this one has proven to be
extremely difficult to measure.
88 Walter V. Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7
(1956). There are types of cases in which collateral review enables a court to scrutinize
certain claims that are not efficiently reviewable on direct appeal. For example, an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim may be difficult to litigate on direct appeal because of
the trial counsel's potential continued involvement and because of the practical difficulty of
presenting evidence outside the record that may bear on the claim. The need for collateral
review, however, does not compel a need for federal habeas review. Collateral review of
claims best reviewed after direct appeal is generally available within the state system and
could be constitutionally mandated.
89 Of course, there is no universal agreement on the matter. Commentators have long
debated whether state courts, however well intended, uphold federal rights as effectively as
the federal courts. State v. Phillips, 540 P.2d 936, 938-39 (Utah 1975); Chemerinsky &
Kramer, supra note 73, at 78 ("There is a vigorous scholarly debate over whether state courts
equal federal courts in their ability and willingness fairly to adjudicate federal constitutional
claims."); Bator, supra note 68, at 631; Jerry K. Beatty, State Court Evasion of United States
Supreme Court Mandates During the Last Decade of the Warren Court, 6 VAL. U. L. REV.
260 (1972); R. Bruce Carruthers, Note, Gideon, Escobedo, Miranda: Begrudging
Acceptance of the United States Supreme Court's Mandates in Florida, 21 U. FLA. L. REV.
346 (1969); Bert Neuborne, Toward Procedural Parity in Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM.
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a. The Futility of Objective Measures of Relative Court Quality
In response to Bator's and Friendly's call to limit federal habeas
principally to cases in which defendants are denied a fair process in state
court, commentators have insisted that the Constitution requires more than a
hearing; it also conveys a "right to have constitutional claims correctly
decided."90 But that truism just begs the question, what qualities does one
attribute to a correct constitutional decision. For example, suppose a state
supreme court's divided decision is overturned by a federal habeas court's
granting the writ; a federal appellate panel reverses that decision two to one;
and that result is reversed by the Supreme Court five to four. The final
outcome is the correct one only in the political sense that American society
has adopted the convention of accepting constitutional decisions by the
Supreme Court unless overturned by constitutional amendment or the Court
itself.9' That is, we have accepted the Court's pronouncement as "a
sufficient moral predicate in the sense that society will accept it as sufficient
for the exercise of the power in question. 92
A more objective measure of the relative accuracy of state and federal
courts with respect to constitutional criminal law questions is likely beyond
the realm of existing tools of measurement.93 Justice Jackson perpetually
& MARY L. REV. 725 (1981); Sandra Day O'Connor, Trends in the Relationship Between
Federal and State Courts from the Perspective of a State Court Judge, 22 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 801, 813-14 (1981); John W. Oliver, Postconviction Applications Viewed by a Federal
Judge-Revisited, 45 F.R.D. 199, 221-25 (1968) (citing poor record of state courts); Ronald
Schneider, State Court Evasions of United States Supreme Court Mandates: A
Reconsideration of the Evidence, 7 VAL. U. L. REV. 191 (1973); Michael Wells, Behind the
Parity Debate: The Decline of the Legal Process Tradition in the Law of Federal Courts, 71
B.U. L. REV. 609, 609-10 (1991); Michael Wells, Is Disparity a Problem?, 22 GA. L. REV.
283, 300-01 n. 84 (1988).
90 Peller, supra note 16, at 593.
91 This is the main point of Professor Bator's analysis. He writes, "the concept of
'freedom from error' must eventually include a notion that some complex of institutional
processes is empowered definitively to establish whether or not there was error, even though
in the very nature of things no such processes can give us ultimate assurances." Bator, supra
note 7, at 447; see Allan Ides, Habeas Standards of Review Under 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1): A
Commentary on Statutory Text and Supreme Court Precedent, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 677,
711 (2003) ("Within the context of underdeterminate laws, there is, in essence, no superior
authority when the law does not mandate a particular result.").
92 Louis L. Jaffe, Judicial Review: Question of Law, 69 HARV. L. REv. 239, 244 (1955).
93 Chemerinsky & Kramer, supra note 73, at 79-80; Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity
Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the Federal Judiciary, 36 UCLA L. REV. 233, 261-73
(1988); REDISH, supra note 83, at 3 (explaining that "it would be difficult to devise a system
of measurement which could be used to answer [the question whether federal courts are
better equipped to protect constitutional rights] empirically").
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reminds us that no court, not even the Supreme Court, is infallible.94 Some
court must have the final say, and that court will inevitably reverse some of
the judgments that come to it. But there is no measuring tool to compare
the quality of the decisions reached. Erwin Chemerinsky and Larry Kramer
make the point well: "[t]hat state and federal courts reach different results
says nothing about which system is better-perhaps the results reached by
state courts are correct and federal courts are prejudiced against state




To recognize, as this analysis does, that constitutional rights in
criminal cases are formally indeterminate within a closed system of legal
analysis is not to deny that "rights exist independently of the institutional
processes designed to vindicate them., 96  Nor does it suggest that the
content of rights changes based upon the circumstances in which the right is
asserted.97 Rights can have substantive content even if the precise
articulation of that content is a political rather than a legal exercise. Rights,
and their remedies, may not be deducible from some set of preestablished
principles to which a formal process of technical legal reasoning may be
applied. Although jarring at some level, that realization need not be tragic.
To see that there is more to defining and enforcing fundamental rights than
simply perfecting the legal technique for identifying their content should be
a refreshing revelation, not an alarming one.
b. Directional Preferences
Although objective assessments of the relative accuracy of two court
systems may be impossible, we might still reach firm conclusions about the
directional shift in accuracy of the ultimate outcome of the whole decision-
making process. Hoffman and Stuntz, for example, contend that because
only the defendant can seek habeas review of an adverse decision "the
threat of habeas relief must, at the margin, tend to push state courts toward
greater protection of federal rights."9" This conclusion is a function not
94 Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring in result).
95 Chemerinsky & Kramer, supra note 73, at 79.
96 Peller, supra note 16, at 592; Yackle, supra note 6, at 1016-17; cf FREEDMAN, supra
note 19, at 122 (quoting a memorandum from then law clerk William Rehnquist to Justice
Jackson: "This is not to say that there should be no federal standards of due process, but only
that we should trust the state cts [sic] to enforce them, as we do other federal standards.").
97 Yackle, supra note 6, 1015 (accusing Bator of "insist[ing] that the meaning of 'due
process' changes" in calling for a lower standard of review on federal habeas).
98 Hoffman & Stuntz, supra note 68, at 90-91; id. at 100 ("[T]he grant of habeas relief
resembles a reversal on appeal. . . .To whatever extent appellate review in general deters
lower court judges from misapplying law, habeas review should exert a similar deterrent
effect on state judges."). Robert Cover too concluded that habeas review improves the
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only of additional layers of federal review, but also of the anticipated affect
of that review on state courts. As Robert Cover argued, "[i]f state courts
knew that errors would be corrected by a federal court requiring a retrial,
they might be more solicitous toward claims brought before them." 99
These directional arguments suffer from two flaws. First, they
resonate only if one has predetermined that decisions in favor of expansive
interpretations of federal constitutional rights are always better or more
accurate decisions. If enforcing individual federal rights has a cost, erring
on the side of greater enforcement is not inevitably better.'00 And if
incarcerating those guilty of committing crimes as a form of social
punishment has value, then there is a cost to over-enforcing criminal rights.
Some commentators argue that the pressure toward greater protection
is justified because state courts tend to be stingy with federal rights. Bert
Neubome, for example, has argued that although state courts are usually
subjectively faithful to their oath to follow the federal constitution when the
law is clear, they "are less likely to resolve arguable issues in favor of
protecting federal constitutional rights than are their federal brethren."'0 '
Similarly, Erwin Chemerinsky stresses that federal courts, although not
necessarily "better" than state courts, may "in some places, on some issues.
• . be more likely to vindicate constitutional claims."'0° He therefore
concludes that "litigants raising constitutional claims should be able to
select the forum they prefer."'
10 3
Even if tilting in favor of greater protection were an incontrovertibly
justifiable goal, however, broad federal habeas could still be problematic.
These arguments rest on the assumption that habeas review will have only
one effect on state court processes, i.e., it will lead them to find more
constitutional violations in order to avoid reversal by federal habeas courts.
The actual effects of changing the level of federal habeas review, however,
may be more complicated.
likelihood that a constitutional violation will be recognized. Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note
74, at 1045-46. He cautioned, however, that while the likelihood of accurately identifying a
constitutional violation increased with broad federal habeas, so too did the chance that a non-
violation would be inaccurately treated as a violation. Id.
99 Id. at 1046.
1oo See, e.g., Woolhandler, supra note 6, at 635 ("The argument for diminishing the role
of federal courts in individual rights enforcement ... turns less on a claim of strict parity
than it does on a claim that federalism is a constitutional value appropriately enhanced at the
expense of the competing constitutional value of individual rights enforcement.").
101 Neuborne, supra note 66, at 1120.
'02 Chemerinsky & Kramer, supra note 73, at 91.
103 Id.; Chemerinsky, supra note 93, at 300-26.
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First, it may be inaccurate to assume that a state court that is worried
about reversal would protect federal rights significantly more vigorously in
response to more expansive habeas review. Although the state may not
collaterally attack an acquittal, it can and often does seek direct review of
adverse appellate decisions in the Supreme Court. In recent decades, that
Court has often granted certiorari to overturn state decisions that favor
defendants on federal constitutional issues.10 4 The extent to which broader
habeas review would lead a state court concerned about federal reversal to
favor federal claims is thus tempered to at least some degree by the Court's
existing willingness to reverse cases finding federal constitutional
violations. Theoretically, broader habeas review would add to the deterrent
effect on state courts, but the magnitude of that effect given direct review
by the Supreme Court may not be large.
Second, broader habeas review may actually create incentives for state
judges to be less sensitive to federal constitutional claims. Unpopular
claims can be politically difficult to grant, particularly for elected state
judges. If such a state judge knows that a life-tenured federal judge is
equally obligated to bear the political burden of a publicly unpopular
decision, broad federal habeas may cause the state court to rule against
defendants more often than it would were the state court the last line of
defense. Legislators are known to tailor their votes to let another do the
dirty work as long as the right result is reached in the end. Elected judges
might well respond the same way.
105
There should be at least some question, however, as to whether federal
judges really will do the constitutional dirty work particularly well even
under the broadest habeas regime. Many highly respected scholars, who are
also experienced litigators, perceive federal courts to be a more sympathetic
forum than state courts with respect to federal rights. 0 6 One cannot help
104 See Appendix I (listing seventy-three cases since 1970 in which the Court has granted
certiorari to vacate or reverse state court decisions even though the state court had ruled in
favor of the defendant on a federal constitutional issue).
15 See Steven Semeraro, Responsibility in Capital Sentencing, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 79,
97-98, nn.50-56 (2002) (citing psychological evidence tending to show that those who know
someone else has ultimate responsibility for a decision will minimize negative outcomes and
take the decision less seriously).
106 Bert Neuborne claims that these subjective beliefs "frequently shape the forum
selection strategy in constitutional cases today as they have in the past." Neubome, supra
note 66, at 1116:
As a civil liberties lawyer for the past ten years, I have pursued a litigation strategy premised on
two assumptions. First, persons advancing federal constitutional claims against local officials
will fare better, as a rule, in a federal, rather than a state, trial court. Second, to a somewhat
lesser degree, federal district courts are institutionally preferable to state appellate courts as
forums in which to raise federal constitutional claims.
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but wonder, however, whether they are remembering a different era. The
judges on the federal bench in the early years of constitutional death penalty
review were often disciples of the Warren Court and the early Burger Court,
whose justices aggressively advanced federal rights in areas ranging from
school desegregation remedies to capital punishment to abortion. In the
shadow of those Courts, the lower federal court judges probably were more
attentive to federal claims than their state counterparts, many of whom
came of age before the criminal procedure revolution or during the period
that it remained controversial.
By the late 1990s, however, the federal bench had become
overwhelmingly populated with judges who, whether appointed by a
Democrat or a Republican, had little connection to the heyday of habeas
review in the 1960s or even early death penalty review in the 1970s. They
were instead products of an era of federal court restraint in habeas cases.
By contrast, today's state judiciary has overwhelmingly known nothing but
federally-regulated criminal procedure, and many state courts have gone
beyond federal standards to offer greater protection to criminal defendants
under their own state constitutions. 10 7 The dogma of federal superiority
may thus be a relic that has outlived its vitality.
Id.; see id. at 1120 ("Stated bluntly, in my experience, federal trial courts tend to be better
equipped to analyze complex, often conflicting lines of authority and more likely to produce
competently written, persuasive opinions than are state trial courts."); id. at 1127 n.79 ("I
concede the inherent difficulty of proving the validity of these psychological factors....
Many of us who routinely practice constitutional law ... think that we perceive them at work
in a sufficiently large proportion of our cases to require their consideration in our forum
selection strategy."); FREEDMAN, supra note 19, at 152:
Practically, the problem is that an unrealistic reliance on the quality of justice in state judicial
systems will inevitably (as in Frank) lead to unacceptable outcomes. These in turn will
invariably produce a backlash whose certain result will be legislative or judicial action to insure
more extensive habeas corpus review (as in Moore), and whose likely result will be to undermine
public support for the criminal justice system as a whole.
Id. My personal, albeit limited, death penalty litigation experience differs. In a Mississippi
death case from the 1980s and 1990s, the state supreme court gave thorough and careful
consideration to the defendant's claims, reversing his first death sentence. Wiley v. State,
449 So. 2d 756 (Miss. 1984). By contrast, the federal district court seemed hostile to the
entire proceeding, and the Fifth Circuit panel made clear that it had no intention to rule for
the defendant unless Supreme Court precedent directly compelled that result. Wiley v.
Puckett, 969 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1992). This is precisely the attitude that commentators often
attribute to state courts. Neubome, supra note 66, at 1124-25 ("[l]n my experience federal
judges appear to recognize an affirmative obligation to carry out and even anticipate the
direction of the Supreme Court. Many state judges, on the other hand, appear to
acknowledge only an obligation not to disobey clearly established law.").
107 See Appendix II (showing that since 1970 at least 32 states in over 100 cases have
interpreted their own state constitutions more broadly than the federal constitution).
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C. WEIGHING THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF BROAD HABEAS REVIEW
The arguments on each side of the breadth-of-review debate are
significant but ultimately not decisive or compelling. The costs of broad
federal habeas are potentially profound, but too general to yield firm
conclusions. The benefit of a searching federal review turns on the quality
of state constitutional decision-making and the effect that habeas review has
on that decision-making process. Based on the available evidence, the risk
that strict federal review would retard state processes seems potentially as
great as the risk that narrower review would weaken state processes.
Absent empirical evidence that is unlikely to materialize, the wiser course
may be to abandon the quest for habeas's true form and start asking a
different question.
III. A DIFFERENT CRITIQUE OF THE OBJECTIVE-REASONABLENESS
STANDARD
The Supreme Court's objective-reasonableness standard does not
enable a federal habeas court to evaluate coherently a state court ruling on a
federal constitutional question. This approach gives the Court itself the
flexibility to grant the writ when a majority believe that justice so requires.
But it leaves the lower federal courts at sea without a compass to guide their
course. Even worse, the objective-reasonableness standard effectively
discourages state courts from engaging in the careful analysis of federal law
that Article VI demands and on which the 1996 Act is premised.
The Court first developed the concept of a "reasonable state court
decision" in the context of its retroactivity doctrine. 10 8 If an issue were
108 Contemporaneously with the expansion of federal constitutional rights to the states in
the early 1960s, the Court developed the retroactivity doctrine limiting the ability of inmates
convicted before a decision came down to exploit the new right. For two decades, the Court
handled retroactivity matters on an ad hoc basis considering the purposes of the exclusionary
rule, the state's reliance on an old rule, and the effect of applying the new rule on the
administration of the criminal justice system. See, e.g., Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297
(1967) (addressing retroactivity of constitutional rules respecting lineups); Linkletter v.
Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636-40 (1965) (same for rule requiring states to apply exclusionary
rule to evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment). These decisions limited the
applicability of new rules in a variety of ways. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 302 (1989)
(explaining that retroactivity doctrine had been used "to limit application of certain new
rules to cases on direct review, other new rules only to the defendants in the cases
announcing such rules, and still other new rules to cases in which trials have not yet
commenced"). In the late 1980s, the Court adopted a bright line approach to retroactivity. It
held that newly announced rules would apply to all cases on direct review at the time the rule
was announced, Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322 (1987), but that new rules generally
would not apply on habeas review, i.e. to a case in which the direct review process was
completed before the rule was announced. Teague, 489 U.S. at 310.
2004]
STEVEN SEMERARO
debatable among reasonable jurists, the Court held, overturning a state court
decision would require a new rule that could not be applied retroactively on
habeas. 09 In some cases, however, the Court granted the writ despite stark
disagreement among the justices themselves."0 These decisions raised a
puzzling question: If the standard is reasonable debatability, and obviously
reasonable jurists were debating, how could the Court grant the writ?
In interpreting the 1996 Act, the Court drew on its retroactivity
doctrine, explaining that it had established an objective reasonableness test
rather than one that turned on the subjective judgments of particular
jurists."' Unfortunately, if one cannot look to the actual views of respected
judges to determine whether an issue is reasonably debatable, then there are
effectively no objective criteria to guide a federal habeas judge in
evaluating a state court decision. "Objective," in this context, means the
federal judge's subjective assessment of the merits of the state court's
decision. 1 2  For example, in one recent case, a five-member majority
asserted that "[t]he Court of Appeals was nowhere close to the mark" in
rejecting the state court's decision as objectively unreasonable.' 3  Yet
Justice Breyer, writing in dissent on behalf of four members of the Court,
flatly disagreed, declaring that the defendant's rights were "obvious[ly]"
violated and thus the state court's decision was unreasonable.' 4 As one
commentator described the state of the law: "One thing is certain. The
objective unreasonableness standard needs further and substantial
elaboration."' 5
109 To determine whether granting the writ would require a new rule, the Court
developed the debatable-among-reasonable-jurists concept. If an issue was debatable, a state
court decision either way would be reasonable, and overturning it would require a new rule
that could not be announced on habeas review. See Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 258
(1990); Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 488 (1990); Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407 (1990).
10 For example, in one case, the Mississippi Supreme Court, a panel of the Fifth Circuit,
and three members of the Court all concluded that a particular issue of Eighth Amendment
law was at least debatable. Nonetheless, the majority of the Court granted the writ. See
Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 230 (1992) (holding that rule requiring re-sentencing when
a jury weighed a vague aggravating circumstance was an established rule even though Court
had never addressed the issue).
" Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,414 (2000).
112 Professor Ides thorough analysis of each of the Court's opinions addressing the
objective unreasonable issue shows that the Court has failed to give objective content to the
standard. Ides, supra note 91, at 698-759 (explaining that the Court "provides almost no
sensible guidance to lower federal courts ... ").
113 Yarborough v. Alvarado, 124 S. Ct. 2140, 2150 (2004).
114 Id. at 2152 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
115 Ides, supra note 91, at 718.
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Like any incoherent standard, a problem with objective reasonableness
is that it produces unpredictable results. Lower federal courts have received
no meaningful guidance, and their attempts to articulate logical approaches
have been rejected out of hand. 1 6 Whenever the Court denies the writ, its
tone suggests that the lower federal courts should reject a petition whenever
there is some plausible justification for the state decision. The many
divided decisions in recent habeas cases, however, confirm that whenever
an issue is truly debatable, one cannot predict how the Court will decide.' 
17
Unpredictability is not inevitably undesirable.' 18 In some cases, an
uncertain standard may have the desirable effect of forcing decision-makers
to stay well away from the line between legitimacy and illegitimacy.
Perhaps the Court believes that its incoherent standard will force the lower
federal courts to err well on the side of denying the writ, while leaving the
Court itself the freedom to grant or deny based on its own subjective
assessment of the state court decision.
Even if that were a legitimate interpretation of the 1996 Act, it would
improperly ignore the likelihood that the objective-reasonableness standard
will discourage state courts from carefully analyzing federal law. No matter
how thorough a state judge's opinion may be, a federal habeas court will re-
examine the merits and pronounce it reasonable or not, based on an
incoherent standard. Given that, a rational state judge may put little effort
116 Mitchell v. Esparza, 124 S. Ct. 7, 10 (2003) (per curiam) (holding that "a state court
need not even be aware of our precedents .... "); Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2003)
(holding that state court is not required to cite or even be aware of applicable U.S. Supreme
Court cases); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76 (2002) (rejecting Ninth Circuit
holding that writ should be granted when federal habeas court has a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake had been made).
117 The Court's recent habeas cases are split between those that are unanimous, or nearly
so, in which the state court's decision on the merits was almost certainly correct, see, e.g.,
Middleton v. McNeil, 124 S. Ct. 1830 (2004) (per curiam); Mitchell, 124 S. Ct. at 7 (per
curiam); Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1 (2003) (per curiam); Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S.
634 (2003) (per curiam); Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19 (2002) (per curium); Early, 537
U.S. 3; Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685 (2002), and fractured decisions where the state was
possibly wrong, but the issue was surely debatable. Alvarado, 124 S. Ct. 2140 (5-4
decision); Wiggins v. Smith, 540 U.S. 510 (2003) (7-2 decision); Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (5-4
decision); Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 791 (2000) (6-3 decision); Ramdass v. Angelone,
530 U.S. 156 (2000) (4-1-4 decision); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 424 (2000) (6-3
decision); Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225 (1999) (5-4 decision). Reviewing the Court's
decision to grant the writ in Penry, one of the obviously debatable cases in which the Court
nonetheless found the state decision objectively unreasonable, Professor Ides concludes that
the "[C]ourt's perception of objective unreasonableness is premised largely, if not
completely, on the perceived error committed by the state court." Ides, supra note 91, at
715-16.
"8 Cf LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 64 (rev. ed. 1969) ("[S]pecious clarity can
be more damaging than an honest open-ended vagueness.").
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into analyzing the federal issue. If the result is correct, the federal court
will supply the analysis necessary to affirm." 9 As the Court has held, "a
state court need not even be aware of our precedents.' 20 If, by contrast, the
state court's result is wrong, the federal court can take the political heat for
reversing the conviction.
By effectively encouraging state court inattention to federal issues, the
Court's objective-reasonableness standard is at odds with Article VI, which
mandates that "states shall be bound" by federal law and must treat it as the
"supreme Law of the Land.' 2' That clause should prohibit a state court
from trivializing federal law, and thus compel the federal courts to reject
any standard of review that countenances lax state court decision-making.
The Court's current approach is also inconsistent with the 1996 Act.
The Act's language grants state courts the same freedom to interpret federal
law that the federal courts have. 22 Notably, however, Congress directs the
writ to a state court's "unreasonable application" of federal law. 23 The
legislative history also indicates that Congress sought to heighten the
degree of deference when state courts properly apply federal law. 124 The
choice of the term "application," rather than "result," is telling. Nothing in
the text or legislative history countenances a standard of review that permits
state courts to give the shortest possible shrift to federal law, so long as the
result is arguably reasonable.
The objective-reasonableness test should thus be replaced with a test
that both (a) satisfies the 1996 Act's call for deference to reasonable state
119 For example, in Andrade, 538 U.S. at 63, the state court compared the facts before it
to those in a Supreme Court case that had denied relief, but effectively ignored an arguably
similar case in which relief had been granted. The Court accepted that approach as
reasonable, even though the Court itself provided much more thorough analysis to a similar
claim raised on direct review in a case that it decided on the same day as Andrade. Compare
id. at 75-77, with Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 28-31 (2003).
120 Mitchell, 124 S. Ct. at 10.
121 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
122 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2000) (equating federal law to decisions of the Supreme
Court, which both the state courts and the lower federal courts must follow).
123 Id.
124 142 CONG. REc. S3446-02, S3447 (daily ed. Apr. 17, 1996) (statement of Sen. Orrin
Hatch) ("The deference to state law is good, because it just means that we defer to them if
they have properly applied federal law."); 141 CONG. REc. S7803-01, S7846 (daily ed. June
7, 1995) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch) (explaining that "currently, Federal courts have
virtual de novo review of a State court's legal determination. Under our change, Federal
courts would be required to defer to the determination of state courts, unless the State court's
decision was 'contrary to or involved in an unreasonable application of clearly established
Federal laws."'); see Ides, supra note 91, at 693-97 (reviewing legislative history).
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court applications of federal law and (b) fulfills Article VI's mandate that
state courts thoroughly, and therefore reasonably, apply federal law.
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE STANDARD OF STATE REASONING-PROCESS REVIEW
Greater scrutiny of the process of state decision-making, rather than
merits review under an incoherent standard, would better accord with both
Article VI and the 1996 Act. The process at issue would not be the process
review proposed by Professor Bator and adopted by the Court, at least for
Fourth Amendment claims, in Stone v. Powell.125 Under that approach, the
federal habeas court would ask only whether the defendant had a fair
opportunity to raise and argue federal issues in state court. As many have
stressed before, process review in that sense does no good if the state
decision-maker ignores federal law. 2 6 If the point of habeas is to root out
just such unreasonable decisions, process review of that type makes no
sense at all.
127
The reasoning-process review proposed here would require federal
courts to defer to a state court's decision on the merits of a federal
constitutional question so long as the state court demonstrated through its
written opinion that it fully understood that it was bound by federal law.'
28
If the state court did not live up to its constitutional obligations, however, a
federal court applying reasoning-process review would return the case to
state court instructing it to apply the applicable federal law with due care.
By ensuring that state courts approached federal issues with seriousness and
reasonable logic, but otherwise deferring to their decisions, this form of
review would both (a) effectively root out the cases in which a state court
fails to uphold its constitutional oath, and (b) provide the deference that the
1996 Act requires.
A. THE MECHANICS OF REASONING-PROCESS REVIEW
Programmatically, a federal court applying reasoning-process review
would engage in a two-step analysis. First, the habeas court would ask
125 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1975) (recognizing federal jurisdiction but refusing to
hear Fourth Amendment claim on habeas unless petitioner was not granted a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the claim in state court); Bator, supra note 7, at 455.
126 See, e.g., Peller, supra note 16, at 678 ("The failure to recognize possible state court
resistance to federal law is the fundamental flaw of [Bator's] process jurisprudence.");
Yackle, supra note 6, at 1014-19.
127 The Bator-Friendly-Stone model of process review was proposed in Congress
throughout the 1980s and early 1990s. See, e.g., S. 2216, 97th Cong. (1982); S. 238, 99th
Cong. (1985); S. 1356, 103d Cong. (1993). Congress wisely rejected this approach in the
1996 Act.
128 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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whether the state court cited all applicable federal law-including statutes,
Supreme Court cases, and federal appellate court cases from the circuit in
which the state is located-that the federal habeas court would have cited
had it been charged with the responsibility to decide the claim on the
merits. Under the 1996 Act, state court decisions may be overturned on
habeas review only if they contravene clearly established federal law as
decided by the Supreme Court. Nevertheless, the state courts'
constitutional obligation to treat federal law as supreme should require them
to consider applicable lower federal court cases even if a state judge may
ultimately reject those cases as unpersuasive. In some instances, a federal
habeas court may be uncertain as to whether it would have cited to
particular cases. Reasoning-process review would not require a checklist;
doubtful situations should be decided in favor of upholding the state court's
decision. But opinions wholly failing to cite significant federal authority
would be returned to state court for consideration of that law.
Second, a federal habeas court should examine whether the state court
has demonstrated a thorough understanding of federal law. The merits of
the decision would be off limits to the lower federal courts. Their sole
function would be to ensure that the state court explained logically how
federal law supports the result it reached. This step would involve more
judgment than the relatively objective citation-of-applicable-precedent first
step. But some clear lines can be drawn. Rote citation of federal
precedents would not be sufficient. Conversely, a thorough analysis of
applicable federal law that the federal habeas court would have addressed if
it had been presented with the question de novo could not be reconsidered.
Even if a federal court disagreed with the weight to be assigned to varying
factors or the balances drawn among them, its role would be limited to
ensuring that the state court seriously considered applicable federal law. As
with any decision, close cases will arise. But the federal courts have
extensive experience distinguishing between de novo review and more
limited scrutiny of a reasoning process, 2 9 and in all events, it is hard to
imagine that habeas cases could be any more controversial than they have
been. 3 0
129 Most prominently, federal courts have long distinguished between de novo review and
reasoning-process review when scrutinizing administrative agency decisions. See JACOB A.
STEIN, ET AL. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 51.01 [2] (2004).
130 See supra text accompanying note 117. To be sure, a determined state court could
play the reasoning-process review system by citing the right cases and considering the
appropriate factors, while still reaching a result that short-changes the defendant. By
requiring state courts to take full account of federal law, and deferring to their decisions
when they do, reasoning-process review requires the state court to be both properly educated
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B. REMEDYING A FAILURE TO ENGAGE IN AN ADEQUATE REASONING
PROCESS
When a state court fails to meet the reasoning-process review standard,
the federal habeas court should not decide the merits of the issue itself.
That approach would improperly let the state court off the constitutional
hook that should require it to treat federal law as the supreme law.31 As
discussed above, de novo habeas review might even provide an
inappropriate incentive for state courts to engage in sloppy reasoning on
politically charged constitutional issues, leaving the federal court the tough
job of overturning a popular conviction.
When a state court does not engage in sufficiently thorough reasoning,
the federal habeas court should identify the weakness-i.e., the cases not
cited or the factors left unaddressed-and return the case to the state system
for appropriate analysis. If a federal district court ordered a case returned,
the state should hav:e the right to appeal to the appropriate federal circuit
and to seek certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court. The same reasoning-
process review standards would apply in those courts.
Some will argue that this approach would be too demeaning to the
state courts. 32 But state judges, who are obligated to follow federal law,
can fairly be required to understand and apply that law in a sophisticated
way. Requiring a state court to reconsider a federal issue when it engages
in less than the constitutionally mandated thorough analysis (and effectively
passes the buck to a federal habeas court) is not inappropriately demeaning.
Indeed, a federal court arguably acts in a more demeaning fashion when it
overturns a reasoned state court decision simply because it disagrees with
the merits. Reasoning-process review provides great deference to the state
court when deference is appropriate, i.e., when the state thoroughly
analyzes all of the applicable federal law.
Under reasoning-process review, a good number of cases might at first
be returned to the state courts. Since 1996, some have surely become
accustomed to the sloppy treatment of federal law countenanced by the
Supreme Court. Before long, however, state courts would understand the
careful analysis required to avoid time-consuming remands and, assuming
state courts are capable of applying federal law, few cases would be
returned.
and appropriately responsible. While not perfect, reasoning-process review may be superior
to alternative federal habeas review standards that ignore one or the other.
1' U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
132 Compare Peller, supra note 16, at 686 (arguing that it is less intrusive to reverse
convictions than to require states to provide life tenure to judges).
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Occasionally, a state court might defiantly and repeatedly fail to apply
federal law. For such rare cases, there would need to be a safeguard
permitting some federal court to review the merits of the decision. This
concern could be addressed by retaining the petitioner's statutory right to
seek a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court after each final state court
decision.'33 This approach would create a clear line of demarcation
between the role of (1) the lower federal courts (to review the state court's
reasoning process); and (2) the United States Supreme Court, which could
also review federal issues de novo when it chose to grant certiorari directly
to review a state court decision.'
34
C. APPLYING REASONING-PROCESS REVIEW
This sub-section uses the proceedings in Ramdass v. Angelone, 35 a
Virginia death penalty case, and Yarborough v. Alvarado,36 a California
non-death penalty murder case, to illustrate how the reasoning-process
review test would differ from existing habeas practice.
1. Ramdass v. Angelone
Ramdass's case was pending on certiorari before the United States
Supreme Court when that Court decided Simmons v. South Carolina.'37 In
Simmons, the Court held that a state presenting aggravating evidence of a
capital defendant's likely future dangerousness may not, as a matter of due
process, deny the defendant the opportunity to inform the jury that the
alternative to a death sentence is life in prison without possibility of
parole. 3 8  Because Ramdass had raised that issue in his petition for
"' 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (2004). This approach to habeas remedies is also consistent with
the 1996 Act's preference for U.S. Supreme Court control of the developments of federal
criminal procedural law.
1 The 1996 Act should not be interpreted to prohibit de novo Supreme Court review in
egregious cases. The Court has recognized that the 1996 Act does not abrogate the Court's
constitutionally mandated appellate jurisdiction over federal issues and has left open the
possibility that the Act's specific limitations on habeas jurisdiction do not necessarily curb
the Court's own jurisdiction to grant the writ. Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 660-63
(1996). Further, four members of the Court concluded that the 1996 Act, though mandating
careful consideration of state court conclusions, should actually be interpreted to require de
novo review at least by the Supreme Court. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 387 (1999).
135 530 U.S. 156 (2000).
136 124 S. Ct. 2140 (2004).
131 512 U.S. 154 (1994).
138 Id. at 169; id. at 177 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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certiorari, the Court reversed and remanded Ramdass's case to the Virginia
Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of Simmons.'39
On remand, the state court denied Ramdass's Simmons claim. The
subsequent habeas review was long, tortured, and merits-focused. In the
end, seven federal judges would have denied the writ, while six would have
granted it.140 Although ultimately upholding the state court's decision, the
federal courts' thorough analysis showed little deference to, or respect for,
that court. And by supplying the analysis that the state court neglected, the
federal courts effectively encouraged future state courts to abdicate their
constitutional responsibility.
The federal proceedings would have looked much different under the
proposed reasoning-process review. At the first step, the federal district
court could easily have determined that the state court's decision was
inadequate. The unanimous Virginia Supreme Court opinion cited only one
federal case, Simmons. To be sure, there are federal issues that implicate
only one case. But the issue in Ramdass was not one of them. On the
contrary, the Simmons Court cited several earlier cases dealing with the due
process principles that come into play when a defendant seeks to rebut a
prosecution argument.141 A court that seriously intends to apply federal law
to a case that bears similarities to Simmons, but may differ in some way,
would need to at least recognize the constitutional foundation on which
Simmons was built. One could quibble about whether the Virginia court
should have cited every case that the Supreme Court had cited in Simmons,
and quibbles should be resolved in favor of the state. In Ramdass's case,
however, more attention to federal law was obviously required as evinced
by each of the federal habeas courts citing at least a half dozen relevant
federal cases. 42 The plurality opinion in the Supreme Court cited at least
139 Ramdass v. Virginia, 512 U.S. 1217 (1994).
140 Five members of the Supreme Court and two from the Fourth Circuit believed the
writ should be denied while four members of the Supreme Court, the dissenting judge from
the court of appeals, and the federal district court judge would have granted the writ. See
infra note 149.
141 Sinimons, 512 U.S. at 161-71. One of the concurring opinions argued that the Eighth
Amendment should compel the state to permit a defendant to inform the jury of parole
ineligibility in every capital case. Id. at 172-74 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing additional
Eighth Amendment cases). Because the plurality opinion left this issue open, id. at 162 n.4,
a state court denying relief on due process grounds should-given its article VI
obligations-have considered the Eighth Amendment issue as well.
142 Angelone v. Ramdass, 187 F.3d 396, 403-08 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing seven federal
cases); id. at 412-15 (Mumaghan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing seven




twelve. 143 Under the reasoning-process test, the case would thus have been
returned to the state court for fuller consideration of the applicable federal
case law.
The second step in the reasoning-process test would look beyond the
citation to authority to the quality of the state court's reasoning.144 On this
count, the Virginia Supreme Court would fare no better. Its opinion was a
mere two pages, and its entire analysis of federal law was contained in a
single two-sentence paragraph. 45 The state court reasoned that Simmons
required the state to allow the defendant to inform the jury about parole
status only if the defendant was ineligible for parole. 46  Although (1)
Virginia had a "three-strikes" law rendering defendants with three
convictions ineligible for parole, and (2) Ramdass had been convicted three
times, the Virginia court nevertheless concluded that Ramdass was still
technically eligible for parole because the judgment had yet to be entered on
the guilty jury verdict establishing his third strike. 47 The state court based
this decision on a single state law opinion holding that a "jury's verdict of
conviction upon which no judgment had been entered [was] not a
conviction within [the] meaning of [the state] statute disqualifying [a]
person from holding public office.' 48
That formalistic reasoning wholly ignored that Ramdass-if spared
death-was overwhelmingly likely to spend the rest of his life in prison.
The state court never explained why federal due process principles should
permit the state to deny Ramdass's capital sentencing jury that obviously
relevant information. To be sure, a reasonable court could plausibly
conclude that federal due process standards were not violated by Ramdass's
death sentence. Indeed, a slim majority of the U.S. Supreme Court
143 Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156, 159-210 (2000).
144 A federal court applying reasoning-process review in Ramdass could have stopped
after step one. The second step is nonetheless addressed in the text to illustrate how it could
be applied.
145 The relevant portion of the court's opinion read:
In Simmons, the Supreme Court held that when 'future dangerousness' is an issue in the
sentencing phase of a capital murder case, the jury is entitled to information concerning the
defendant's parole ineligibility. Hence, Simmons applies only if Ramdass was ineligible for
parole when the jury was considering his sentence.
Ramdass v. Commonwealth, 450 S.E.2d 360, 361 (Va. 1994), cerl. denied sub nonz.,
Ramdass v. Virginia, 512 U.S. 1085 (1995) (citations omitted).





ultimately held as much. 149 To be a reasonable application of federal law,
however, that conclusion must rest on careful analysis explaining why
virtually identical cases should not be treated the same. All of the federal
habeas court decisions, including the Supreme Court's, did rest on many
pages of rigorous analysis.'50 Given that, one cannot coherently explain
why the cryptic Virginia decision--despite its utter lack of any similarly
rigorous examination of federal law-was held objectively reasonable.
A federal habeas court applying reasoning-process review could have
easily determined that the state court did not consider the factors that the
federal court would have identified as being relevant to the decision,
namely the due process principles underlying Simmons. The state court's
citation to a case about eligibility to hold elective office is obviously no
substitute for thorough analysis of federal law. Rather than deem
objectively reasonable an inadequate state opinion that effectively mocked
Article VI, and was undeserving of the deference to reasonable applications
of federal law mandated by the 1996 Act, a federal habeas court applying
reasoning-process review would have returned the case to the Virginia
Supreme Court so that it could apply the due process law underlying
Simmons to the facts of Ramdass's case.
2. Yarborough v. Alvarado
Alvarado was convicted of murder based in part on un-counseled, un-
Mirandized statements made to the police at the station house.' 5' On
appeal, he argued that his confession should have been suppressed because
149 The plurality may have ruled in Virginia's favor on this point because it concluded
that the state was not seeking to defy or trivialize federal law. Despite the result in Ramdass,
Virginia had applied Simmons expansively in more recent cases. Ramdass v. Angelone, 530
U.S. 156, 177-78 (2000).
150 The federal district court discussed the Simmons issue-not including facts or
procedural history-for four pages, rejecting the state court's conclusion that Simmons did
not compel reversal. Ramdass v. Angelone, 28 F. Supp. 2d 343, 363-68 (E.D. Va. 1998). A
divided Fourth Circuit panel reversed, but not without thorough analysis. The majority
dedicated five pages to analyzing the Simmons claim, Ramdass v. Angelone, 187 F.3d 396,
403-08 (4th Cir. 1999), and the dissenting judge took three more. Id. at 412-15 (Mumaghan,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The Supreme Court's fractured, fifty-four-page
decision had no majority opinion. Raindass, 530 U.S. at 159-210. Of course, the number of
pages that a court discusses an issue is not a perfect proxy for the quality of its reasoning.
See infra Part IV.C.2. Nevertheless, the Court itself has cited to the length of opinions in its
own analysis of reasoning quality. Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 779 (1999)
(distinguishing quality of the analysis in the dissenting and lower court opinions with
reference to the number of pages-eight versus fourteen); Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, 462 U.S. 87, 98, 98 n. I1 (1983) (stating that "[t]he sheer volume
of proceedings before the Commission is impressive").
151 Yarborough v. Alvarado, 124 S. Ct. 2140, 2144-47 (2004).
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it was the product of un-Mirandized custodial interrogation. A California
appellate court rejected the Miranda claim,152 and the state supreme court
denied discretionary review.'
5 3
As in Ramdass, the federal bench was divided. The district court
denied the writ, but the Ninth Circuit reversed on the ground that the state
court erred in not considering the relevance of Alvarado's youth to the
question of custody.'5 4  In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court reversed.
Alvarado's conviction was thus upheld even though seven of the thirteen
federal judges hearing the case would have granted the writ.
Also like Ramdass, the substance of the federal court opinions reveal
the state court's failing. 55 In addressing the first prong of the reasoning-
process test, a federal habeas court would have observed that the California
court in an unpublished opinion cited but one federal case, Miranda.1
6
Any federal court would surely have considered more. In deciding the
merits of Alvarado's claim, the Supreme Court cited seven federal cases,'57
and Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion cited a couple more. 5 8 The Ninth
Circuit cited at least a dozen as well as several state court cases that had
considered the federal issue in factual contexts similar to that in
Alvarado.159 As in Ramdass, a federal court applying reasoning-process
review would have readily concluded that the state court did not cite the
federal cases that it would have considered had it been responsible for
resolving the federal claim.
152 The state published only certain portions of its opinion. In the published version, the
state's only comment on Alvarado's Miranda claim was the statement "that the interrogation
was not custodial, and hence that the officers were not obligated to admonish Alvarado of his
rights." People v. Soto, 74 Cal. App. 4th 1099, 1101 (1999). It discussed the issue more
extensively in an unpublished opinion. See text accompanying notes 151-67.
' Alvarado, 124 S. Ct. at 2146.
154 Alvarado v. Hickman, 316 F.3d 841, 850 (9th Cir. 2002).
155 Although not directly relevant to the reasoning-process test proposed here, it is telling
that the state appellate court refused to publish the portion of its opinion dealing with
Alvarado's Miranda claim, even though other portions were published. People v. Soto, 74
Cal. App. 4th 1099, 1101 (1999) ("In the unpublished portion of this opinion, we address...
[Alvarado's contention] that he was subjected to custodial interrogation, but was not given
the requisite admonitions of his rights."). When an issue of federal law is capable of
dividing the federal bench as this one did, one would expect that a state court seeking in
good faith to fulfill its Article VI obligation to treat federal law as supreme would publish its
opinion.
156 People v. Soto, No. VA035109, slip op. at 12-13 (L.A. County Super. Ct. Sept. 13,
1999) (unpublished portion of opinion; copy on file with the author) (citing only Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)).
117 Alvarado, 124 S. Ct. at 2147-52.
' Id. at 2153-56 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
159 Alvarado, 316 F.3d at 845-57.
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The California state court's analysis fairs no better. In upholding the
state decision, the Supreme Court said that the California court applied the
reasonable-person-under-the-circumstances test articulated in Thompson v.
Keohane.160  But that is far from clear. The state court never cited or
discussed the facts in Thompson or the purpose behind Miranda's custody
requirement. It did include a three-quarter page block quote from People v.
Ochoa,16' a state case that had quoted Thompson's reasonable-person-in-
the-circumstances test. 162 But the opinion on Alvarado's claim focused on
facts that were largely irrelevant to the Thompson test. 163 Although the
court dedicated a substantial number of pages to the federal issue,' 64 and
ultimately purported to answer the correct question, "[w]e are satisfied that
a reasonable person under the circumstances in which Alvarado was
questioned would have felt free to leave," 65 it never considered the factors
that any federal court would have found relevant to that issue. Instead, the
state court focused almost exclusively on the non-threatening nature of the
officer's interrogation techniques, an issue bearing little relevance to
whether Alvarado would have felt free to leave. 166  As Justice Breyer
explained in his dissenting opinion, the unthreatening nature of the
interrogation "might be highly significant were the question one of
coercion. But it is not. The question is whether Alvarado would have felt
free to terminate the interrogation and leave. In respect to that question,
police politeness, while commendable, does not significantly help the
analysis.'
67
In contrast to the California court's inaccurate focus on interrogation
techniques, the Supreme Court majority drew directly from its own
precedent to identify a series of facts that weighed against a finding that
Alvarado was in custody. 168 The state court paid little attention to most of
these. Second, the Court listed facts suggesting that Alvarado was in
custody.' 69 The state court paid virtually no attention to these. Finally, the
Court facilely considered whether Alvarado's juvenile status necessarily
160 Alvarado, 124 S. Ct. at 2146 (citing Thomson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 113 (1995)).
161 19 Cal. App. 4th 353, 401-02 (1998).
162 Soto, No. VA035109, slip op. at 12-13.
163 Id. at 13-19.
'6 Id. at 12-19.
165 Id. at 19.
16 Id. (emphasizing that Alvarado "was not subjected to the intense and aggressive
tactics employed" and the officers "did not fabricate evidence or subject him to the intense
pressure used").
167 Yarborough v. Alvarado, 124 S. Ct. 2140, 2154 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
168 Id. at 2149-50.
169 Id. at 2150.
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should have played a role in the custody inquiry. 70 The state court paid no
attention whatsoever to that issue.'
7
'
The Alvarado opinions, like those in Ramdass, demonstrate that the
federal courts continue to carry the laboring ore in analyzing challenging
federal constitutional issues in at least some state criminal cases. To justify
the deference that the 1996 Act requires, and to fulfill Article VI's mandate,
the California state courts should have been required to analyze carefully all
of the applicable federal law, including the definition of custody and the
impact of the suspect's youth.
Under reasoning-process review, the federal habeas courts in both
Ramdass and Alvarado would have returned the cases to the state courts
with instructions to (1) consider all of the applicable federal law and (2)
thoroughly analyze the federal issues in light of that law. If the state courts
complied, their decisions would be summarily affirmed. If, however, the
state courts again failed to accord federal law proper respect, a federal
habeas court would again return the case to state court, or the U.S. Supreme
Court could grant certiorari to resolve the question de novo.
D. PRECEDENT FOR REASONING-PROCESS REVIEW
Federal habeas review has long been merits oriented. 72  But the
practice of deferring to well-reasoned opinions by inferior decision-making
bodies, while remanding those that offer less than thorough analysis, is well
established in other areas of the law. The reasons for these practices are
seldom discussed explicitly, but likely stem from the notion that an inferior
decision-maker is entitled to deference when making decisions within its
area of primary expertise so long as it demonstrates that it treats the
decision with an appropriate level of care. That rationale applies with full
force to state courts making decisions on criminal cases of significant local
import.173
170 Id. at 2150-51.
171 The Ninth Circuit did adopt a more logical two-step inquiry asking first whether the
state court had erred, and then if so, whether the result was objectively unreasonable.
Alvarado v. Hickman, 316 F.3d 841, 845 (9th Cir. 2002). Although logical, the concept of a
wrong, but reasonable, decision may nonetheless be incoherent. In any event, the Supreme
Court has shown no inclination to adopt that approach.
172 See supra Part 1.
173 Professor Woolhandler has analogized current federal habeas review to the delegation
of authority to expert agencies. Unlike the agency cases, she argues, deferential
reasonableness review in habeas cases rests final authority with the state court without any
theory of delegation to justify that deference. Woolhandler, supra note 6, at 639-40. The
theory of deference in the habeas regime proposed in this article responds to her concern by
separating the review functions of the lower federal courts and the Supreme Court. With
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As long ago as 1953, the Court stressed the importance of a state court
"opinion specifically setting forth its reasons that there has been no denial
of due process of law."'17 4  And the Court's post-1996 cases, though not
requiring a state court to cite federal precedent,'75 have praised those state
courts that have thoroughly analyzed federal law.'7 6 Although the approach
proposed here would impose a new formal requirement to cite and
thoroughly analyze federal authority, it does not impose an obligation the
value of which should come as a surprise to state courts.
With respect to requiring state courts to do the analysis themselves, an
analogy can be drawn to the Court's common practice of remanding to state
courts for reconsideration in light of newly decided Supreme Court cases. 177
Only when the state court defies the mandate to apply federal law does the
Court decide the merits of the case itself.1
7 1
Another analogy can be found in the review--direct or habeas-
provided in certain capital cases. The initial decisions forming federal
death penalty doctrine stressed that states needed to apply meaningful
appellate review. 7 9  Later cases established that in the context of errors
respect to the former, state courts have the same constitutional duty and obligation to decide
constitutional issues as the lower federal courts. The proper justificatory question is thus not
one of deference, but of authority to overturn a thoroughly reasoned state court decision that
first decided the merits. With respect to the Supreme Court, this article proposes a standard
that would require de novo review, responding to Woolhandler's concern about unjustified
delegation of all federal authority to state courts.
'14 Smith v. Baldi, 344 U.S. 561, 569-70 (1953).
175 Mitchell v. Esparza, 124 S. Ct. 7, 10 (2003) (per curiam) ("We have held that a state
court need not even be aware of our precedents .... "); Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2003)
(holding that state courts are not required to cite applicable U.S. Supreme Court cases or
even be aware of them).
176 Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 640 (2003) (per curiam) (explaining that state
supreme court "identified the applicable Supreme Court precedents ... and 'reaffirmed the
principles articulated' in those decisions") (quoting People v. Vincent, 565 N.W.2d 629, 633
(Mich. 1997)) (internal quotations omitted); Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 23-24
(2002) (holding California Supreme Court's multiple citation to proper federal authority
supports the view that the state court's decision was not contrary to federal law); id. at 25
(praising state court's "lengthy and careful opinion").
'77 See, e.g., Ramdass v. Virginia, 512 U.S. 1217 (1994) (reversing and remanding for
reconsideration in light of Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994)); see also
ROBERT L. STERN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 317-20 (8th ed. 2002) (describing the
reversal and remand for reconsideration procedure).
178 Yates v. Aiken, 484 U.S. 211, 215 (1988) ("Since the state court did not decide that
question, we shall do so."); id. at 218 ("Since [the South Carolina Supreme Court] has
considered the merits of the federal claim, it has a duty to grant the relief that federal law
requires.").
179 Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276 (1976) ("By providing prompt judicial review of
the jury's decision in a court with statewide jurisdiction, Texas has provided a means to
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regarding the vagueness of the criteria that rendered a defendant eligible for
the death penalty, meaningful review meant a particular type and quality of
scrutiny. 80 The Court has, itself, demonstrated great reluctance, however,
to address the merits of these issues, preferring to remand to the state courts
to apply the required analysis.18 '
The Court recently adopted a similar approach in the very different
context of complex antitrust cases. In overturning a Ninth Circuit decision
finding antitrust liability, the majority stressed that the lower court's
judgment had to be overturned because that court had paid too little
attention to the subtle factors that federal antitrust law requires courts to
take into account. The majority all but conceded that, had the Ninth Circuit
produced the thorough analysis that Justice Breyer put forth in dissent, the
Court would have had no reason to reverse the case. 82 Because the Ninth
promote the evenhanded, rational, and consistent imposition of death sentences under law.");
Proffit v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 251 (1976) (noting that "meaningful appellate review" is
made possible by the requirement that the trial judge justify the imposition of a death
sentence with written findings and observing that the Florida Supreme Court indicated that it
conducted an independent analysis of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances in the
particular case); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976) ("Where the sentencing
authority is required to specify the factors it relied upon in reaching its decision, the further
safeguard of meaningful appellate review is available to ensure that death sentences are not
imposed capriciously or in a freakish manner."). Even pre-Furman, the Court had suggested
that there is a heightened need for review in capital cases. See Griffin v. United States, 336
U.S. 704, 708 (1949) (applying added requirement in capital case that lower court explain
the basis for denying a motion to reopen a judgment of conviction based on newly
discovered evidence).
'8o Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 752 (1990) ("An automatic rule of affirmance
in a weighing State [when at least one valid aggravating circumstance is found by the
sentencer] would be invalid under [Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) and Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982)], for it would not give defendants the individualized
treatment that would result from actual reweighing of the mix of mitigating factors and
aggravating circumstances.").
181 Richmond v. Lewis, 506 U.S. 40 (1992); Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 230 (1992)
("We require close appellate scrutiny of the import and effect of invalid aggravating factors
to implement the well-established Eighth Amendment requirement of individualized
sentencing determinations in death penalty cases."); Sochor v. Florida, 504 U.S. 527 (1992);
Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308 (1991); Clemons, 494 U.S. 738. The federal courts have
also employed a somewhat similar approach with respect to the application of evidentiary
rules in capital sentencing trials. Although not prohibiting the use of hearsay and
sequestration rules in capital sentencing trials, the federal courts have held that state courts
must exercise special care in enforcing those rules when the death penalty is at issue. See
Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 (1979) (per curiam) (holding that hearsay rules must be
applied flexibly to permit full consideration of mitigating evidence); see also Dutton v.
Brown, 812 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (same with regard to witness sequestration
rule).
182 Justice Souter explained for the Court:
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Circuit had not fulfilled its obligation to analyze the issue thoroughly,
however, the majority required the lower court to try again. As Justice
Souter explained, "[t]he obligation to give a more deliberate look than a
quick one does not arise at the door of this Court and should not be satisfied
here in the first instance."
18 3
In each of these analogies, the Court has expressed a clear preference
to avoid merits review while retaining ultimate authority to decide the issue
itself. With respect to agency rule-making decisions, however, the Court
reviews decision-making processes without retaining ultimate authority to
reach the merits. A court reviewing an agency rule-making does "not...
substitute its judgment for that of the agency. 18 4  Rather, the court's
function "is to insure a fully informed and well-considered decision.' 85 It
fulfills that function by scrutinizing the decision to ensure that the agency
"examine[d] the relevant data and articulate[d] a satisfactory explanation
for its action including a 'rational connection between the facts found and
In light of our focus on the adequacy of the Court of Appeals's analysis, Justice Breyer's
thorough-going, de novo antitrust analysis contains much to impress on its own merits but little
to demonstrate the sufficiency of the Court of Appeals's review. The obligation to give a more
deliberate look than a quick one does not arise at the door of this Court and should not be
satisfied here in the first instance. Had the Court of Appeals engaged in a painstaking discussion
in a league with Justice Breyer's (compare his 14 pages with the Ninth Circuit's 8), and had it
confronted the comparability of these restrictions to bars on clearly verifiable advertising, its
reasoning might have sufficed to justify its conclusion. Certainly Justice Breyer's treatment of
the antitrust issues here is no "quick look." Lingering is more like it, and indeed Justice Breyer,
not surprisingly, stops short of endorsing the Court of Appeals's discussion as adequate to the
task at hand .... Professor Areeda also emphasized the necessity, particularly great in the quasi-
common-law realm of antitrust, that courts explain the logic of their conclusions. "By exposing
their reasoning, judges ...are subjected to others' critical analyses, which in turn can lead to
better understanding for the future. P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW, 1507, 402 (1986). As the
circumstances here demonstrate, there is generally no categorical line to be drawn between
restraints that give rise to an intuitively obvious inference of anticompetitive effect and those that
call for more detailed treatment. What is required, rather, is an enquiry meet for the case,
looking to the circumstances, details, and logic of a restraint. The object is to see whether the
experience of the market has been so clear, or necessarily will be, that a confident conclusion
about the principal tendency of a restriction will follow from a quick (or at least quicker) look, in
place of a more sedulous one. And of course what we see may vary over time, if rule-of-reason
analyses in case after case reach identical conclusions. For now, at least, a less quick look was
required for the initial assessment of the tendency of these professional advertising restrictions.
Because the Court of Appeals did not scrutinize the assumption of relative anticompetitive
tendencies, we vacate the judgment and remand the case for a fuller consideration of the issue.
Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 779-81 (1999).
' Id. at 779-80.
184 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. of the United States v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29,43 (1983).
185 Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519,
558 (1978).
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the choice made."",18 6  Although the standard of review is narrow, the
court's inquiry is "searching and careful.' ' 7 When an agency decision is
not supported by appropriate reasoning, the courts do not hesitate to act. 18
But "[t]he reviewing court should not attempt itself... to supply a reasoned
basis for the agency's action that the agency itself has not given. ' t 9
Instead, the court must return the matter to the agency for a decision
applying the appropriate standards.
The reasoning-process review proposed here would require lower
federal courts on habeas review to scrutinize state court decisions on federal
constitutional issues as federal circuit courts now scrutinize many agency
decisions. The Supreme Court, however, would retain the authority to
review the state decision de novo when an inmate seeks certiorari directly
from a state court's decision.
CONCLUSION
The standard of review in federal habeas cases has long been a matter
of considerable debate. Historically, most commentators and the Court
itself have structured the controversy in terms of the breadth of federal
review. The arguments pro and con for broad federal habeas, however, are
on the whole unconvincing. Ultimately, whether one favors broad or
narrow review seems to turn on who bears the burden of demonstrating the
societal effects of varying the level of scrutiny.
This article concludes that neither side can win this debate. Instead,
we should move beyond it by recognizing that state courts are
constitutionally obligated to apply federal law as vigorously as the federal
courts. Their oath to uphold that constitutional command both entitles them
to deference and charges them with the duty to elevate federal law to its
required status as the supreme law of the land.
In an era of relatively stable federal constitutional criminal procedure
doctrine, societal interests would be better served by abandoning more or
less vigorous lower federal court review of the merits of state court
decisions, and replacing it with careful review of the state courts' reasoning
process. This approach would, first, eliminate the need for the incoherent
objective-reasonableness standard. Second, reasoning-process review
186 Motor Vehicle Mfrs., 463 U.S. at 43.
187 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
188 See, e.g., United States Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
(returning significant portions of the FCC's rule making decisions under the 1996
Telecommunications Act to the FCC); United States Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 290 F.3d 415
(D.C. Cir. 2002) (same).
189 Motor Vehicle Mfrs., 463 U.S. at 43.
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would impose a standard that is more deferential to thoroughly reasoned
state court opinions than the current approach, because federal habeas
courts would be prevented from second guessing the merits of a well-
reasoned state court opinion. Third, it would provide appropriate incentives
for a state court to take federal law seriously by requiring it to re-analyze a
federal issue if it gives the issue short shift the first time around. 90 Fourth,
it would create a safety valve for stubbornly defiant state courts by
permitting the Supreme Court to grant certiorari and address the merits of
the federal issue de novo. By compelling state courts to cite and thoroughly
analyze all applicable federal law, but deferring to their reasoned decisions
on the merits, this approach would provide both the proper incentives for
state courts to live up to their constitutional oath and the proper deference
when they do.
190 This approach would respond to those who argue that anything less than de novo
federal review transforms "the rule of law ... [into] the rule of almost-law." Woolhandler,
supra note 6, at 644. Reasoning-process review would give state courts every chance to live
up to their constitutional obligation without any federal merits review. But if state courts
repeatedly refuse to properly engage federal law, the potential for de novo review limited to
the U.S. Supreme Court would be preserved.
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APPENDIX I
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
Reversing or Vacating State Court Decisions Ruling In Favor of a Criminal
Defendant on Issues of Federal Constitutional Law
No Issue On Which Court Citation
Reversed or Vacated
I Confrontation Clause California v. Green, 399
U.S. 149 (1970)
2 Right to Privacy in Trash California v. Krivda, 409
U.S. 1068 (1972)
3 Use of Statement in Violation of Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S.
Miranda in Rebuttal 714 (1975)
4 Inventory Search of Car South Dakota v.
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364
(1976)
5 Warrantless Seizure of Driver of Pennsylvania v. Mimms,
Lawfully Stopped Car 434 U.S. 106 (1977)
6 Definition of Interrogation Rhode Island v. Innis, 446
U.S. 291 (1980)
7 Seizure of Person Whose Michigan v. Summers,
Residence is Searched 452 U.S. 692 (1981)
8 Car Search Michigan v. Thomas, 458
U.S. 259 (1982)
9 Overbreath of Child Pornography New York v. Ferber, 458
Law U.S. 747 (1982)
10 Double Jeopardy Where Oregon v. Kennedy, 456
Defendant Moves for Mistrial U.S. 667 (1982)
11 Due Process Required for Illinois v. Batchelder, 463
Sobriety Test U.S. 1112 (1983)
12 Definition of Custody California v. Beheler, 463
U.S. 1121 (1983)
STEVEN SEMERARO
13 Informing Capital Jury of California v. Ramos, 463
Governors Power to Commute U.S. 992 (1983)
Sentence of Life Without Parole
14 Protective Search of Passenger Michigan v. Long, 463
Area of Lawfully Stopped Car U.S. 1032 (1983)
15 Search of Closed Container Illinois v. Andreas, 463
Found During Lawful Search U.S. 765 (1983)
16 Due Process Required for Illinois v. Batchelder, 463
Sobriety Test U.S. 1112 (1983)
17 Proof Sufficient to Support Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S.
Search Warrant 213 (1983)
18 Search Incident to Arrest Illinois v. Lafayette, 462
U.S. 640 (1983)
19 Good Faith Exception to Massachusetts v.
Exclusionary Rule Sheppard, 463 U.S. 1205
(1983)
20 Trial on Multiple Overlapping Missouri v. Hunter, 459
Charges Under Double Jeopardy U.S. 359 (1983)
Clause
21 Due Process Required for Montana v. Jackson, 460
Sobriety Test U.S. 1030 (1983)
22 Request for Counsel During Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462
Interrogation U.S. 1039 (1983)
23 Admission of Evidence of South Dakota v. Neville,
Refusal to Submit to Blood Test 459 U.S. 553 (1983)
24 Plain View Search Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S.
730 (1983)
25 Inventory Search of Car Florida v. Meyers, 466
U.S. 380 (1984)
26 Consent to Search Florida v. Rodriguez, 469
U.S. 1 (1984)
27 Proof Sufficient to Support Massachusetts v. Upton,
Search Warrant 466 U.S. 727 (1984)
28 Public Safety Exception to New York v. Quarles, 467
Miranda U.S. 649 (1984)
29 Prosecution on More Serious Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S.
Charge After Plea to Lesser 493 (1984)
Charge Does Not Violate Double
Jeopardy
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30 Open Fields Doctrine Oliver v. United States,
466 U.S. 170 (1984)
(reversing Maine v.
Thornton, 485 A.2d 952
(1984))
31 Warrantless Search of California v. Carney, 471
Motorhome U.S. 386 (1985)
32 Search by Public School Officials New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469
U.S. 325 (1985)
33 Preclusive Effect of Miranda Oregon v. Elstad, 470
Violation on Second Voluntary U.S. 298 (1985)
Statement
34 No Double Jeopardy Violation Pennsylvania v.
When Tried on Suspended Goldhammer, 474 U.S. 28
Counts After Appeal and (1985)
Reversal on Other Counts
35 Standard for Involuntary Colorado v. Connelly, 474
Confession U.S. 157 (1986)
36 Whether Confrontation Clause Delaware v. Van Arsdall,
Error was Harmless 475 U.S. 673 (1986)
37 Confrontation Clause Delaware v. Fensterer,
474 U.S. 15 (1985)
38 Seizure of Evidence in Lawfully New York v. Class, 475
Stopped Car U.S. 106 (1986)
39 Evidence Necessary to Support New York v. P.J. Video,
Seizure of Material Protected by Inc., 475 U.S. 868 (1986)
First Amendment
40 Definition of Interrogation Arizona v. Mauro, 481
U.S. 520 (1987)
41 Good Faith Exception to Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S.
Exclusionary Rule 340 (1987)
42 Standard for Waiving Counsel. Connecticut v. Barrett,
479 U.S. 523 (1987)
43 Interpretation of Search Warrant Maryland v. Garrison, 480
U.S. 79 (1987)
44 Trial on Related Charge After Montana v. Hall, 481 U.S.
Reversal Not Based on Guilt or 400 (1987)
Innocence Not Barred by Double
Jeopardy
45 Right to Counsel in Post- Pennsylvania v. Finley,
conviction Proceedings 481 U.S. 551 (1987)
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46 Right to Privacy in Trash California v. Greenwood,
486 U.S. 35 (1988)
47 Definition of Seizure Michigan v. Chesternut,
486 U.S. 567 (1988)
48 Ordinary Traffic Stop Not Pennsylvania v. Bruder,
I Custody 488 U.S. 9 (1988)
49 Protect Warrantless Sweep of Maryland v. Buie, 494
Residence U.S. 325 (1990)
50 Search of Paper Bag in Trunk of California v. Acevedo,
Car 500 U.S. 565 (1991)
51 Defendant Not Seized Until California v. Hodari D.,
Tackled 499 U.S. 621 (1991)
52 Random Search of Passengers on Florida v. Bostick, 501
Bus With Request for Consent U.S. 429 (1991)
53 Consent to Search Car Florida v. Jimeno, 500
Reasonably Extends to Paper Bag U.S. 248 (1991)
Inside Car
54 Confrontation Clause Michigan v. Lucas, 500
U.S. 145 (1991)
55 Good Faith Exception to Arizona v. Evans, 514
Exclusionary Rule U.S. 1 (1995)
56 Prohibit Defendants From Using Georgia v. McCollum,
Peremptory Strikes in Racially 505 U.S. 42 (1992)
Discriminatory Manner
57 Penalty-Enhancement Provision Wisconsin v. Mitchell,
Did Not Violate Defendant's 508 U.S. 476 (1993)
Free Speech Rights By
Purporting to Punish His Biased
Beliefs
58 Statutory Ban on Consideration Montana v. Egelhoff, 518
of Evidence of Voluntary U.S. 37 (1996)
Intoxication Did Not Violate Due
Process
59 Car Search Pennsylvania v. Kilgore,
518 U.S. 938 (1996)
60 Car Search Pennsylvania v. Labron,
518 U.S. 938 (1996)
61 Substantive Due Process and Kansas v. Hendricks, 521
Double Jeopardy U.S. 346 (1997)
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62 Police Officers Making Traffic Maryland v. Wilson, 519
Stop May Order Passengers to U.S. 408 (1997)
Get Out of Car Pending
Completion of Stop
63 Visitor Has No Legitimate Minnesota v. Carter, 525
Expectation of Privacy While on U.S. 83 (1998)
Property Used for Commercial
Purposes
64 Extradition Clause New Mexico v. Reed, 524
U.S. 151 (1998)
65 Search Warrant Not Needed to Florida v. White, 526 U.S.
Seize Car from Public Place 559 (1999)
When Probable Cause Exists to
Believe That It Was Forfeitable
Contraband
66 Probable Cause That Car Maryland v. Dyson, 527
Contained Contraband Satisfied U.S. 465 (1999)
Automobile Exception to Search
Warrant Requirement
67 Car Search Wyoming v. Houghton,
526 U.S. 295 (1999)
68 Arresting Officer's Subject Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532
Motivation U.S. 769 (2001)
69 Reasonable Seizure Includes Not Illinois v. McArthur, 531
Allowing Defendant to Enter U.S. 326 (2001)
Residence Without a Police
Officer Until a Search Warrant
Was Obtained
70 Sixth Amendment Right to Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S.
Counsel Attaches Only to 162 (2001)
Charged Offenses
71 Probable Cause to Arrest Maryland v. Pringle, 540
Occupant of Car in Which Drugs U.S. - (2003)
were Found
72 Destruction of Evidence Illinois v. Fisher, 540 U.S.
- (2004)
73 Warnings Required to Accept Iowa v. Tovar, 540 U.S.




74 Check Point Stop to Locate Illinois v. Lidster, 124 S.





STATE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
Providing Greater Protection to the Rights of Suspects and the Accused
Under Their Own State Constitutions Than is Provided by the Federal
Constitution




1 Double Jeopardy Attaches Cardenas v. Superior
When Motion for Mistrial Court of Los Angeles
Granted to the Prosecution County, 56 Cal.2d 273,
277 (1961)
2 Double Jeopardy Clause Curry v. Superior Court
of San Francisco, 2
Cal.3d 707, 716 (1970)
3 Limiting Inter-Jurisdictional Com. v. Mills, 286 A.2d
Exception to Double Jeopardy 638, 642 (Penn. 1971)
4 Applying Miranda to State v. Santiago, 492
Impeachment Evidence P.2d 657, 664 (Haw.
1971)
5 Oral Confessions Solicited from Butler v. State, 493
a Suspect While in Custody S.W.2d 190, 198 (Tex.
1973)
6 Reasonable Expectation of Burrows v. Superior
Privacy in Bank Statements Court, 13 Cal. 3d 238
(1974)
7 Sixth Amendment Right to Com. v. Richman, 320
Counsel Applies at Moment of A.2d 351 (Penn. 1974)
Arrest Rather than Indictment
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8 Fruits of Search Incident to People v. Kelly, 77
Arrest Must Be Limited to Misc.2d 264, 268-69
Evidence in Connection with (N.Y. 1974)
the Purpose of the Arrest
9 Search Incident to Arrest State v. Kaluna, 520 P.2d
51, 60 (Haw. 1974)
10 Right to Trial by Jury for All State v. Sklar, 317 A.2d
Crimes, Whether Serious or 160, 169 (Me. 1974)
Petty
11 Higher Standard of People v. Brisendine, 13
Reasonableness During a Cal. 3d 528, 552 (1975)
Search and Seizure
12 Consent to Search Requires State v. Johnson, 346
Knowing Waiver A.2d 66 (N.J. 1975)
13 Illegally Obtained Inculpatory People v. Disbrow, 16
Statements Cal. 3d 101, 115 (1976)
14 Arrest Warrant People v. Hoinville, 553
P.2d 777, 781 (Colo.
1976)
15 Inventory Search of Seized State v. Opperman, 247
Automobile N.W.2d 673, 675 (S.D.
1976)
16 Substantive Due Process City v. County of Denver
v. Nielson, 572 P.2d 484,
485 (Colo. 1977)
17 Right to Privacy Includes State v. Saunders, 381
Fornication A.2d 333, 339 (N.J.
1977)
18 Due Process Mandates People v. Isaacson, 406
Dismissal in an Entrapment N.Y.S.2d 714, 718, 721
Situation Even Though the (1978)
Defendant Is Predisposed to




19 Proof of Entrapment People v. Spahr, 371
N.E.2d 1261, 1265 (Ill.
1978)
20 Surreptitious Monitoring of State v. Glass, 583 P.2d
Conversations 872, 881 (Alaska 1978)
21 A Custodial Arrest Is Not State v. Hehman, 578
Proper for a Minor Traffic P.2d 527, 529 (Wash.
Violation 1978)
22 Requiring Explicit Waiver of Com. v. Bussey, 404
Miranda Rights A.2d 1309, 1314 (Penn.
1979)
23 Legitimate Expectation of Com. v. DeJohn, 403
Privacy in Bank Records A.2d 1283, 1291 (Penn.
1979)
24 Warrantless Inventory Search of State v. Daniel, 589 P.2d
Closed Container Within a 408, 417-18 (Alaska
Vehicle 1979)
25 Substantive Due Process Right People v. Onofre, 424
to Private Sexual Conduct NYS.2d 566, 569 (1980)
26 Free Speech State v. Schmid, 423
A.2d 615, 628 (N.J.
1980)
27 Inventory Search May Not Be State v. Simpson, 622
Conducted as Pretext for Search P.2d 1199 (Wash. 1980)
for Evidence
28 State Cannot Impose a Com. v. Tate, 432 A.2d
Standardless Permit 1382, 1391 (Penn. 1981)
29 Subsequent Search Florida v. Casal, 410
Unreasonable Absent Probable So.2d 152, 156 (Fla.
Cause 1982)
30 Affidavit Containing Colorado v. Nunez, 658




31 Automatic Standing to Corn v. Sell, 470 A.2d
Challenge Fourth Amendment 457, 496 (Penn. 1983)
Violation When Charged with
Possession Offense
32 Telephone Subscriber Has a People v. Sparleder, 666
Legitimate Expectation of P.2d 135, 144 (Colo.
Privacy in the Records of 1983)
Telephone Numbers Dialed
33 Installation and Use of Pen Com. v. Beauford, 475
Registers and DNR's by Law A.2d 783, 791 (Penn.
Enforcement Authorities Is 1984)
Limited to Those Situations in
Which an Order Issues upon
Probable Cause
34 Search Warrant Lacked People v. Campa, 686
Probable Cause P.2d 634, 642 (Cal. 1984)
35 Plain View Search Requires State v. Chrisman, 676
Prior Justification for Intrusion P.2d 419, 423-24 (Wash.
1984)
36 Use of Defendant's Post-arrest State v. Davis, 686 P.2d
Silence, Regardless of Whether 1143, 1146 (Wash. 1984)
Such Silence Follows Miranda
Warnings, Violates the Due
Process Clause
37 Proof Required to Support Com. v. Upton, 476
Search Warrant of Interior of N.E.2d 548, 559 (Mass.
Mobile Home 1985)
38 No Good Faith Exception to the People v. Bigelow, 488
Exclusionary Rule N.E.2d 451, 458 (N.Y.
1985)
39 Aerial Surveillance of Backyard People v. Cook, 710 P.2d




40 Double Jeopardy Clause People v. Marks, 486
N.Y.S.2d 971, 979 (1985)
41 No Good Faith Exception to the State v. Grawien, 367
Exclusionary Rule N.W.2d 816, 817 (Wis.
1985)
42 Need Sufficient Information In State v. Jones, 706 P.2d
Affidavit to Support Search 317, 326 (Alaska 1985)
Warrant From Anonymous
Informant
43 Road Block Seizures State v. Kirk, 493 A.2d
1271, 1275, 1288 (N.J.
1985)
44 Reasonable Expectation of State v. Tanaka, 701 P.2d
Privacy in Trash 1274, 1277 (Haw. 1985)
45 Proof Required to Justify People v. P.J. Video, Inc.,
Search Warrant 508 N.Y.S.2d 907, 916
(1986)
46 No Good Faith Exception to the People v. Sundling, 395
Exclusionary Rule N.W.2d. 308, 313 (Mich.
1986)
47 Impartial Jury Drawn From Fair State v. Gilmore, 511
Cross Section of Community A.2d 1150, 1169-70 (N.J.
1986)
48 Nighttime Warrantless Search Mason v. State, 534 A.2d
Requires Exigent 242, (Del. 1987)
Circumstances
49 Good Faith Exception to the State v. Novembrino, 519
Exclusionary Rule A.2d 820, 857 (N.J.
1987)
50 Confrontation Clause Van Arsdall v. State, 524
A.2d 3, 34 (Del. 1987)
51 Road Block Seizures City of Seattle v.
Mesiani, 755 P.2d 775
(Wash. 1988)
52 Supporting Affidavit for Search People v. Griminger, 524
Warrant Did Not Satisfy N.E.2d 409, 411-12
Reliability Prong (N.Y. 1988)
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53 No Good Faith Exception to the State v. Carter, 370
Exclusionary Rule S.E.2d 553, 562 (N.C.
1988)
54 Road Block Seizures State v. Henderson, 756
P.2d 1057, 1063 (Idaho
1988)
55 Requiring Notification of State v. Stoddard, 537
Attempt By Counsel to Contact A.2d 446, 457 (Conn.
Suspect Subject to Custodial 1988)
Interrogation
56 Affidavit For Search Warrant State v. Cordova, 784
Did Not Establish Basis For P.2d 30, 37-38 (N.M.
Believing Informant 1989)
57 Affidavit Lacked Probable State v. Jacumin, 778
Cause for Search Warrant S.W.2d 430, 436-37(Tenn. 1989)
58 Reasonable Expectation of State v. Hempele, 576
Privacy in Trash A.2d 793, 810 (N.J.
1990)
59 Reasonable Expectation of State v. Boland, 800 P.2d
Privacy in Trash 1112, 1116 (Wash. 1990)
60 Good Faith Exception to the State v. Marsala, 579
Exclusionary Rule A.2d 58, 68 (Conn. 1990)
61 Good Faith Exception to the Com. v. Edmunds, 586
Exclusionary Rule A.2d 887, 905-06 (Penn.
1991)
62 State Exclusionary Rule Should State v. Oakes, 598 A.2d
Not Be Limited by the Good 119, 120 (Vt. 1991)
Faith Exception
63 Police Must Use Least Intrusive State v. Perham, 814 P.2d
Means to Safeguard an 914, 916 (Haw. 1991)
Arrestee's Property
64 No Good Faith Exception to the Gary v. State, 422 S.E.2d
Exclusionary Rule 426, 430 (Ga. 1992)
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65 Warrant Requirement People v. Scott, 583 NYS
2d 920, 937 (1992)
66 Warrantless Entry Absent State v. Geisler, 610 A.2d
Exigent Circumstances, 1225, 1237 (Conn. 1992)
Exclusionary Rule
67 Good Faith Exception to the State v. Guzman, 842
Exclusionary Rule P.2d 660, 677 (Idaho
1992)
68 Warrantless Car Search State v. Miller, 614 A.2d
1229, 1242 (Conn. 1992)
69 Reasonable Expectation of State v. Oquendo, 613
Privacy During Illegal Seizure A.2d 1300, 1314 (Conn.
1992)
70 Canine Sniff is a Search, Need Commonwealth v.
Probable Cause Martin, 626 A.2d 556,
559-60 (Pa. 1993)
71 Suspicionless Criminal Sitz v. Department of
Investigatory Seizures State Police, 506 N.W.2d
209, 225 (Mich. 1993)
72 No Good Faith Exception to the State v. Gutierrez, 863
Exclusionary Rule P.2d 1052, 1068 (N.M.
1993)
73 Entry to Private Property State v. Johnson, 879
P.2d 984, 993 (Wash.
1994)
74 Warrant Requirement State v. Joyce, 639 A.2d
1007, 1016-17 (Conn.
1994)
75 Open Fields Doctrine State v. Bullock, 901
P.2d 61, 75-76 (Mont.
1995)
76 Expectation of Privacy in Trash State v. Morris, 680 A.2d
90, 94-96 (Vt. 1996)
77 Police Must Notify Home State v. Ferrier, 960 P.2d
Dweller of Right to Refuse 927 (Wash. 1998)
Consent to Search
78 Proof Required for Seizure Jones v. State, 745 A.2d
1 856, 874 (Del. 1999)
2004]
STEVEN SEMERARO
79 Proof Required for Seizure State v. Donahue, 742
A.2d 775, 780-81 (Conn.
1999)
80 Warrantless Search of Car Must State v. Elison, 14 P.3d
Be Justified By Exigent 456, 468 (Mont. 2000)
Circumstances
81 Road Block Seizure State v. Gerschoffer, 738
N.E.2d 713, 726 (Ind.
2000)
82 Proof Required for Seizure Flannory v. State, 805
A.2d 854, 860 (Del.
2001)
83 Affect of Detention on Consent State v. Cardenas-
to Search Alvarez, 25 P.3d 225,
234 (N.M. 2001)
84 Need Reasonable Suspicion Commonwealth v.
Before Investigative Detention Maxon, 798 A.2d 761,
766-68 (Pa. 2002)
85 False Report to Law State v. Allard, 813 A.2d
Enforcement 506, 510 (N.H. 2002)
86 Confront Witnesses State v. Moore, 49 P.3d
785, 791-92 (Or. 2002)
87 Reject Rule Suspect Is Not State v. Randolph, 74
Seized Until He Submits To A S.W.3d 330, 334-36
Show of Authority (Tenn. 2002)
88 Stop Questioning Defendant State v. Roache, 803
and Inform Defendant Attorney A.2d 572, 576-78 (N.H.
Is Attempting To Contact Him 2002)
89 Pretextual Arrest State v. Sullivan, 74
Unconstitutional S.W.3d 215, 218 (Ark.
2002)
90 Drug Sniffing Dog Requires People v. Caballes, 802
Reasonable Suspicion N.E. 2d 202 (Ill. 2003)
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91 Proof Before Valid Waiver of State v. A.G.D., 835 A.2d
Right Against Self- 291, 297 (N.J. 2003)
Incrimination
92 Discretionary Arrest for Traffic State v. Bayard, 71 P.3d
Violation 498, 502-03 (Nev. 2003)
93 No Custodial Arrest for Minor State v. Brown, 792
Misdemeanor Offense Unless N.E.2d 175, 178-79
Exceptional Circumstances (Ohio 2003)
Exist
94 Right to Consult With Lawyer State v. Durbin, 63 P.3d
Before Deciding to Take a 576, 578-80 (Or. 2003)
Breath Test
95 Reasonable Expectation of State v. Goss, 834 A.2d
Privacy in Trash 316, 319 (N.H. 2003)
96 Corroboration of Predictive State v. Martinez, 67 P.3d
Details in Tip From Known 207, 220-21 (Mont. 2003)
Informant Not Enough for Stop
97 Search Cannot Be Justified As State v. O'Neill, 62 P.3d
Incident to an Arrest Unless a 489, 500-01 (Wash.
Valid Custodial Arrest Precedes 2003)
It
98 If Seizure Is Illegal, Subsequent State v. Sprague, 824
Searches Are Tainted A.2d 539, 544-46 (Vt.
2003)
99 Particularized Suspicion State v. Tackitt, 67 P.3d
Needed for Canine Sniff 295, 300-02 (Mont. 2003)
100 Student Drug Testing Violates Theodore v. Delaware
Fourth Amendment Valley School District,
836 A.2d 76, 88-89 (Pa.
2003)
101 Jury Instructions for Death People v. Lavalle, 2004
Penalty Statute N.Y. Lexis 1575, 68
(N.Y. 2004)
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102 Police Must Notify Home State v. Brown, No. CR
Dweller of Right to Refuse 03-914 (Ark. Mar. 25,
Consent to Search 2004)
103 Drug Sniffing Dog Requires Steve v. Branch, No.
Reasonable Suspicion COA03-350 (N.C. Feb.
17, 2004)
104 Police Required to Justify With State v. Askerooth, Minn.
Probable Cause Decision to No. C6-02-318 (June 17,
Place Motorist Stopped for 2004)
Traffic Offense In Patrol Car
